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Prerequisite to the Legitimacy of Lex Sportiva 
and Sport’s Justice System 
BRENDAN SCHWAB1†  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Players are people first, and athletes second. Former American 
National Football League (“NFL”) linebacker Scott Fujita, who was 
also a member of the management committee of the National Football 
League Players Association (“NFLPA”) during his career, wrote in 
2013 of a conversation he was having with his three young daughters 
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on the United States of America’s historic struggle for progress. His 
words were prompted by the United States Supreme Court considering 
legal questions associated with same sex marriage: 
At some point, they will hear the term “separate but 
equal,” and will learn there was a time when their father 
would not have been able to go to the same school or 
sit in the same restaurant with many of the same friends 
that he now shares an N.F.L. locker room with. But then 
I can say to them, “That was a long time ago, and look 
how far we’ve come.” 
I anticipate us having similar conversations about 
women’s suffrage or Rosa Parks. And each time, I’ll be 
able to say that this country moved toward progress. 
Sometimes, change is slow, but when we know better, 
we do better. 
Sometimes, people ask me what any of this has to do 
with football. Some think football players like me 
should just keep our mouths shut and focus on the 
game. But we’re people first, and football players a 
distant second. Football is a big part of what we do, but 
a very small part of who we are. And historically, sports 
figures like Jackie Robinson, Billie Jean King and 
Muhammad Ali have been powerful agents for social 
change. That’s why the messages athletes send — 
including the way they treat others and the words they 
use — can influence many people, especially 
children.”2  
The continued revelations of wide-spread and systemic 
corruption, cheating, and human rights abuse in world sport illustrate 
just how difficult progress can be. When will world sport finally know 
better so it can do better? 
Players are the public face of world sport.3 Athletic performances 
are essential to the prestige, popularity and viability of the Mega 
Sporting Events (“MSEs”) that sit at the pinnacle of world sport, 
including football’s4 World Cup and the Olympic Games. 
 
 2.  N.Y. TIMES, Acceptance by Example, on the Field and at Home (Mar. 23, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/sports/football/scott-fujita-acceptance-by-
example-in-locker-room-and-at-home.html (emphasis added).   
 3.  The words “players” and “athletes” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
 4.  Football, as used in this paper, refers to the sport known as soccer in the United States, 
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Accordingly, the players are essential to the success of the sporting and 
multi-billion-dollar business undertakings of International Sporting 
Organisations (“ISOs”) such as the International Olympic Committee 
(“IOC”), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(“FIFA”), World Rugby, the International Cricket Council (“ICC”) 
and other international sporting federations.5 
The work of professional athletes is, by its nature, highly skilled 
and valuable, yet risky and precarious. As a condition of that work, 
athletes are made subject to regulations by ISOs that are extraordinary 
and far-reaching in their complexity and subject matter.6 Increasingly, 
those regulations are not justiciable in accordance with national law.7 
The athlete, therefore, is at the centre of the intersection between sport 
and human rights. 
Respect for the fundamental rights of the individual is essential to 
progress, the lifting of standards, and is an indispensable element of 
any effective governance system. In adopting the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the peoples of the United 
Nations “reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men 
and women and have determined to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom.”8 The corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights is, according to the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”), “a global 
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they 
operate” and one which “exists independently of States’ abilities and / 
or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does 
 
unless noted. 
 5.  See generally, Rütter+Partner, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
SPORTS ORGANISATIONS IN SWITZERLAND (2013), 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/22/25/11/internation
al_sports_organisations_report_en_ok_neutral.pdf (last visited April 7, 2017); 
FIFA, FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORT 
2015 (2016), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/77/08/7
1/gb15_fifa_web_en_neutral.pdf (last visited April 7, 2017); see also International Olympic 
Committee, IOC ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2015), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/IOC-
Annual-Report/IOC-Annual%20Report-2015.pdf#_ga=1.203402001.1222881834 (last 
visited April 7, 2017). 
 6.  Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations, Good 
governance in International Non-Governmental Sports Organisations at 
203, http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/documents/Good_governance_reports/AGGIS-
report_-_16Good_governance_in_INGSOs__p_190-217_.pdf. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS at 
1, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf 
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not diminish those obligations.”9 Further, “it exists over and above 
compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights.”10 
This paper examines the governance and conduct of ISOs and 
their impact on players by reference to internationally recognised 
human rights. It does so by firstly reviewing the applicable 
international human rights instruments and standards, including those 
promulgated within sport.11  
Secondly, this paper considers the governance of ISOs and how 
they, as cartels, couple the notions of the specificity and autonomy of 
sport with mandatory arbitration clauses to achieve a dominant 
position in their dealings with athletes.12 This dominance is particularly 
pronounced at the global level notwithstanding an historic legal battle 
having been waged by players throughout the world for the recognition 
of their rights to work and contract in their chosen field with liberty 
and freedom. The notions of the autonomy and specificity of sport, 
which are becoming increasingly discredited, run counter to the 
development of a governance framework that has the requisite cultural, 
institutional and legal commitment to the fundamental human rights of 
the players.  
Thirdly, this paper explains the enormous rise in the unionisation 
of professional athletes during a time of declining unionisation across 
industry.13 In so doing, it provides an overview of the circumstances 
and human rights risks confronting players which are encouraging 
them to organise.  
Finally, this paper identifies the essential steps that ISOs must 
take to embed the fundamental rights of players and how those steps 
can fit comfortably within the vast global capacity of ISOs to regulate, 
through political influence and contract, the conduct of everyone 
involved in their sport at the international, regional, and national 
levels.14 Indeed, that legal and political authority can not only be a 
force for good but set a global benchmark for the respect and fulfilment 
 
 9.  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS at 13 (2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See infra Part I. 
 12.  See infra Part II.  
 13.  See infra Part III.  
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/17  7:54 PM 
8 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:4 
of human rights by business. 
I. APPLICABLE INSTRUMENTS AND STANDARDS 
A. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS – SPORT AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Article 1 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization’s (“UNESCO”) International Charter of 
Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport (“UNESCO 
Charter”)15 provides that the practice of physical education, physical 
activity and sport is a fundamental right for all.16 The UNESCO 
Charter sets out a number of universal defining principles which each 
ISO should ensure are upheld both by itself as an international 
governing body in sport and the various sporting bodies and 
stakeholders that operate under each ISO’s auspices.17 Those defining 
principles include: 
• Access to sport without discriminating on the basis 
of ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property or any other basis.18  
• The freedom to develop through sport must be 
supported by all governmental, sporting and 
educational institutions.19  
• Sport must be inclusive and promote equal 
opportunities for all.20  
• Every human being must have the opportunity to 
attain a level of achievement through sport.21  
• All stakeholders must participate in creating a 
strategic vision for sport, including sport 
 
 15.  International Charter of Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport, UNITED 
NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002354/235409e.pdf (last visited 
April 7, 2017). 
 16.  Id. at 2. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/17  7:54 PM 
2017]      WHEN WE KNOW BETTER, WE DO BETTER 9 
professionals.22 
• All stakeholders must ensure their activities are 
economically, socially and environmentally 
sustainable.23 In particular, the organisers of sports 
events “must pay due consideration to the 
overarching principle of sustainability, be it 
economic, social, environmental or sporting,”24 
especially in relation to the legacy of major sports 
events.25 
• Policy decisions must be based on sound factual 
evidence.26 
• Good governance must be implemented.27 
The link between good governance as emphasized in the 
UNESCO Charter and the protection of human rights is important and 
one that will be explored in this paper in relation to the position of the 
players. In his April 2016 report to FIFA For the Game. For the World. 
FIFA and Human Rights, Professor John G. Ruggie wrote:  
Bribery and corruption is not only about giving and 
taking money for private gain that has been intended for 
broader social purposes. It may also enable the parties 
involved to evade legal and contractual requirements, 
including those protecting human rights. Lack of 
financial integrity, therefore, is a foundational source of 
human rights risks.28 
Article 10.5 of the UNESCO Charter imposes clear obligations 
on employers of the players in sport: 
Any employer in the field of physical education, 
physical activity or sport or related areas must pay due 
consideration to the psychological and physical health 
of their employees, including professional athletes. 
International labour conventions and basic human 
 
 22.  Id. at 4. 
 23.  Id. at 5.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 7. 
 28.  John G. Ruggie, For the Game. For the World., HARVARD UNIVERSITY at 21 (2016), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/research/reports/report68. 
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rights must be respected, in particular to avoid child 
labour and human trafficking.29  
Principle 12 of the UNGPs and its commentary provides that an 
“authoritative list of the core internationally recognised human rights 
is contained in the International Bill of Human Rights.”30 The critical 
instruments include the: Universal Declaration of Human Rights;31 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;32 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;33 and the eight 
core conventions of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) as 
set out in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work and its Follow-Up.34 
Without limitation, the relevant instruments entitle everyone, 
including professional athletes, to the: right of freedom of association, 
to form trade unions and to collectively bargain; right to work and the 
free choice of employment; protection of wages; right to equal pay for 
equal work; elimination of forced labour, including through subtle 
means such as the accumulation of debt or the retention of identity 
papers; right, if a child, to special care and assistance; and right to be 
protected against discrimination.35 The UNGPs also provide that, 
“[d]epending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to 
consider additional standards.”36  
Principle 24 of the UNGPs requires enterprises to prioritise their 
efforts to deal with actual or potential human rights risks “that would 
be most severe, recognizing that a delayed response may affect 
remediability.”37 A complete analysis of the actual and potential human 
rights impacts of the conduct and activities of ISOs on players is 
 
 29.  International Charter of Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport, supra, note 
15 at 8 (emphasis added).  
 30.  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 14. 
 31.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 8. 
 32.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx (last visited April 
7, 2017). 
 33.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx  
 34.  ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
Up, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-
ed_norm/—-declaration/documents/publication/wcms_467653.pdf (last visited April 7, 
2017). 
 35.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 8; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 32 at 5-6, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, supra, note 34, at 2. 
 36.  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 14. 
 37.  Id. at 26. 
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beyond the scope of this paper. This paper focuses on three key rights 
of players: (1) the right to organise and collectively bargain; (2) the 
right to work and to the free choice of employment; and (3) the 
protection of wages. These are, in many ways, the foundational and 
most important rights that players need to have respected by ISOs, 
employers, and other enterprises involved in the governance of world 
sport. A failure by sport to respect these rights can end a player’s 
career. 
B. THE REGULATORY COMMITMENT OF ISOs TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Olympic Charter, as in force from 2 August 2015, “expressly 
connects sport, human rights and peace and builds on the philosophy 
that underpinned the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948.”38 
Similarly, article 3 of the FIFA Statutes was amended in February 
2016 to provide that “FIFA is committed to respecting all 
internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the 
protection of these rights.”39 
In 2016, both the IOC and FIFA took steps to embed respect for 
human rights into key aspects of their organisation.40 The IOC held 
meetings with the Sports and Rights Alliance, a coalition of non-
governmental organisations and trade unions, and agreed to amend the 
IOC Host City Contract for 2024 by making express provision in 
relation to human rights.41 Section 13 now provides: 
…the Host City, the Host NOC (National Olympic 
 
 38.  Olympic Charter, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE (2015), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. 
 39.  Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA Statutes, at 63 (Effective April 
2016), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_n
eutral.pdf. 
 40.  Id.; Explanatory Notes to Host City Contract 2024 – Principles, INTERNATIONAL 
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE at 
17, https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Host-
City-Elections/XXXIII-Olympiad-2024/Host%20City%20Contract%202024%20-
%20Principles.pdf#_ga=1.1431858.2090504467.1478856487. 
 41.  Requirements for Human Rights, Labour Rights, Anti-Corruption and Stakeholder 
Involvement for Olympic and Paralympic Games, SPORT & RIGHTS 
ALLIANCE, http://www.sportandhumanrights.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/SRA-Letter-to-IOC.pdf (last visited April 7, 2017); Olympics: Host 
City Contract Requires Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/28/olympics-host-city-contract-requires-human-
rights. 
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Committee) and the OCOG (Organising Committee for 
the Olympic Games) shall, in their activities related to 
the organisation of the Games: 
a. prohibit any form of discrimination with regard to a 
country or a person on grounds of race, colour, sex, 
sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status; 
b.  protect and respect human rights and ensure any 
violation of human rights is remedied in a manner 
consistent with international agreements, laws and 
regulations applicable in the Host Country and in a 
manner consistent with all internationally-recognised 
human rights standards and principles, including the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, applicable in the Host Country; and 
c. refrain from any act involving fraud or corruption, in 
a manner consistent with any international agreements, 
laws and regulations applicable in the Host Country and 
all internationally-recognised anti-corruption standards 
applicable in the Host Country, including by 
establishing and maintaining effective reporting and 
compliance.”42 
In October 2016, FIFA adopted a new strategy, FIFA 2.0: The 
Vision for the Future which states that FIFA must “champion human 
rights” to build FIFA into a stronger institution.43 This requires the 
organisation to “align” its activities with the UNGPs,44 and to “use its 
influence to address these human rights risks as determinedly as it does 
to pursue its commercial interests.”45 
The Olympic Charter includes seven “fundamental principles of 
Olympism.”46 The fourth principle states that: “The practice of sport is 
a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising 
 
 42.  Explanatory Notes to Host City Contract 2024 – Principles, supra, note 40 (emphasis 
added). 
 43.  FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future, FIFA at 30 (Oct. 13, 2016), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/84/35/01/fifa_2.0_vision_lo
w_neu.17102016_neutral.pdf. 
 44.  Id. at 42. 
 45.  Id. at 63. 
 46.  Olympic Charter, supra, note 38. 
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sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, 
which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, 
solidarity and fair play.”47 
The general principles of human rights enunciated in the Olympic 
Charter and the FIFA Statutes, however, have yet to be entrenched as 
express legal rights of athletes working within their purview. A further 
process of regulatory promulgation is needed. Such a process was 
recently contemplated but not completed by the IOC when it, through 
the adoption of Olympic Agenda 2020, moved to address the concerns 
of LGBTI athletes in response to crowd behaviour at the 2014 Sochi, 
Russia Winter Olympic Games.48 Specifically, Recommendation 14 of 
Olympic Agenda 2020 is to “strengthen the 6th Fundamental Principle 
of Olympism.”49 The sixth principle now reads: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Olympic Charter shall be secured without 
discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.50 
In June 2017, FIFA released FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May 
2017 edition.51 The development of the policy accorded with the first 
recommendation of Professor Ruggie in his report to FIFA to “Adopt 
a Clear and Coherent Human Rights Policy” which he described as 
“the first step for any organization on the path to respecting human 
rights.”52 The policy, which was adopted by the FIFA Council in May 
2017,53 provides that: “FIFA is committed to respecting human rights 
 
 47.  Id. at 13. 
 48.  See generally Olympic Agenda 2020, THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC 
COMMITTEE (2017), https://www.olympic.org/olympic-agenda-2020; see also Olympic 
Agenda 2020, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE (Dec. 2014), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20-
Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.234177310.1222881834.1489166123.  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Olympic Charter, supra, note 38. 
 51.  Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May 
2017 Edition 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/12/fifashu
manrightspolicy_neutral.pdf  
 52.  For the Game. For the World., supra, note 28 at 29. 
 53.  Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA Activity Update on Human 
Rights May 2017, 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/21/activity
update_humanrights_may2017_neutral.pdf at 2. 
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in accordance with the UNGPs.”54 
FIFA’s commitment embraces all internationally recognised 
human rights, including those contained in the International Bill of 
Human Rights (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
and the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and its Follow-Up.55 
FIFA’s “salient human rights risks” include “[p]layers’ rights”. 
Accordingly, FIFA “is committed to helping protect the rights of 
football players and will continually evaluate existing regulations and 
processes and, if necessary, consider additional measures to address 
respective risks.”56 Further: 
FIFA embeds its commitment throughout the 
organisation and engages in an ongoing due diligence 
process to identify, address, evaluate and communicate 
the risks of involvement with adverse human rights 
impacts. FIFA is committed to providing for or 
cooperating in remediation where it has caused or 
contributed to adverse human rights impacts.57 
Where national laws and regulations and international 
standards differ or are in conflict with each other, FIFA 
will follow the higher standard without infringing upon 
domestic laws and regulations.58 
Significantly, paragraph 13 of the policy reads: “Human rights 
commitments are binding on all FIFA bodies and officials when 
exercising their respective powers and competencies, including when 
interpreting and enforcing FIFA rules.”59 
Accordingly, FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May 2017 edition 
makes it clear that not only is FIFA committing to respecting 
internationally recognised human rights, it is committed to recognising 
 
 54.  Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May 
2017 Edition 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/12/fifashu
manrightspolicy_neutral.pdf, Paragraph 1 at 5. 
 55.  Id. paragraph 2 at 5. 
 56.  Id. paragraph 5 at 6-7. 
 57.  Id. paragraph 6 at 7. 
 58.  Id. paragraph 7 at 7. 
 59.  Id. paragraph 13 at 10. 
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those rights of the players in a proactive manner which is binding and 
provides for remediation.  
II. SPORTS GOVERNANCE: A MONOLITHIC FRONT 
A. THE SPECIFICITY AND AUTONOMY OF SPORT 
Despite the broad commitment to human rights in the Olympic 
Charter, there are considerable cultural and institutional barriers to the 
full acceptance of the human rights of players by ISOs and the world 
of sport. In simple terms, this is due to how sport is governed and the 
emphasis placed on the autonomy and specificity of sport. These 
notions only serve to exacerbate the anti-competitive governance 
structures of ISOs. 
The fifth and seventh fundamental principles of Olympism 
provide: 
5. Recognising that sport occurs within the framework 
of society, sports organisations within the Olympic 
Movement shall have the rights and obligations of 
autonomy, which include freely establishing and 
controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure 
and governance of their organisations, enjoying the 
right of elections free from any outside influence and 
the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good 
governance be applied… 
7. Belonging to the Olympic Movement requires 
compliance with the Olympic Charter and recognition 
by the IOC.60 
According to the Sports Governance Observer 2015, as prepared 
by Dr. Arnout Geeraert and published by the October 2015 Play the 
Game conference in Aarhaus, Denmark: 
Even though they have allowed politics to influence 
their policies and decisions, autonomy from formal 
regulatory public interference is an obsession for 
[International Sporting Federations, or] ISFs. Modern 
sport’s construction is, in essence, rooted in classic 
liberalism, namely in the concept of freedom of 
association. Autonomy is therefore a deeply ingrained 
 
 60.  Olympic Charter, supra, note 38 at 13-14. 
4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/17  7:54 PM 
16 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:4 
and cherished principle in the sports world. It is an 
essential part of ISFs’ belief system; a doctrine that they 
aim to spread among political institutions and 
stakeholders in order to keep the governance of 
international sport strictly private.”61 
Unconditional, or poorly defined, autonomy presents a threat to 
the good governance of sport. The prevalence of corruption within 
ISOs promoted Play the Game to label 2015 the “year that killed the 
autonomy of sport.”62 In his report of 2 December 2015, Dr. François 
Carrard, the independent chair of the 2016 FIFA Reform Committee, 
wrote: 
FIFA is currently going through the worst crisis of its 
history. The current crisis should also be considered as 
a unique opportunity for FIFA to renew itself. Thus, in 
order to restore confidence in FIFA, significant 
modifications to its institutional structure and 
operational processes are necessary to prevent 
corruption, fraud, self-dealing and to make the 
organisation more transparent and accountable.63 
The previous month, the report of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(“WADA”) independent commission into Russian athletics chaired by 
Mr. Dick Pound found that “[a]ctual and potential conflicts of interest 
at the WADA Executive Committee and Foundation Board make 
decisive actions regarding Code compliance unnecessarily difficult to 
achieve.”64 The report also found a deeply rooted culture of cheating at 
the highest level of Russian athletics involving the governing body and 
anti-doping agency, the exploitation of athletes and bribery and 
corruption within the International Association of Athletics 
Federations (“IAAF”).65 
 
 61.  Arnout Geeraert, Sports Governance Observer 2015, PLAY THE GAME at 13 (Oct. 
2015), http://www.playthegame.org/media/5786679/sgo_report_final_3.pdf. 
 62.  Jens Sejer Andersen, The Year that Killed the Autonomy of Sport, PLAY THE GAME at 
1 (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.playthegame.org/news/comments/2015/021_the-year-that-
killed-the-autonomy-of-sport/.   
 63.  2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, FIFA at 1 (December 2, 2015), 
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/74/17/54/2015.
11.27finalreport_forpublication_neutral.pdf. 
 64.  The Independent Commission Report #1: Final Report, INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
INVESTIGATION at 276 (Nov. 9. 2015), https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_1_en.pdf.  
 65.  The Independent Commission Report #1: Final Report (Nov. 9, 2015) 
https://www.wada-
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Recognition of the “specific nature of sport,” as a notion within 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), is, of 
course, conditional.66 It demands good governance, social dialogue and 
the protection and development of young people, especially through 
education.67  Further, it does not affect sport where it is an economic 
activity.68 Reforms are required for these conditions to be upheld. As 
sports are structured as cartels, they warrant not special treatment and 
protection, but enhanced scrutiny and accountability. 
A 2010 paper of the European Parliament on the TFEU and 
European Union (“EU”) sports policy encourages social dialogue as a 
vehicle for the sports movement to take the lead in resolving tensions 
over the meaning of the specificity of sport, stating: 
Rather than passively relying on the reference to the 
“specific nature of sport” contained in Article 165 to 
seek to repel the influence of EU law in sport, the sports 
movement should take a lead in defining this contested 
term. This definition should be built into the relevant 
sports regulations following an open and transparent 
method of operation facilitated by the governing bodies 
but involving affected stakeholders. The definition 
should be thoroughly reasoned and backed with robust 
data.69 
However, the development of social dialogue within sport has 
proven to be particularly challenging. The paper also notes: 
In this respect, the reference in Article 165(2) to the 
promotion of cooperation between bodies responsible 
for sports adds impetus to the (European) 
Commission’s agenda. In particular, the Commission 
 
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_1_en.pdf.  
 66.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION at 120 (October, 26, 2012), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-
fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_2&format=PDF; Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union & Comments, THE LISBON TREATY, http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-
treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments.html. 
 67.  See generally id. 
 68.  See generally id; Case C-519/04P David Meca Medina and Igor Majcen v. 
Commission (2006) ECR I-6991 and Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission 
(2004) ECR II-3291. 
 69.  Dr. Richard Parrish, et al., The Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy: 
Study, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT at 8, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/cult/dv/esstudyeusportspoli
cy/esstudyeusportspolicyen.pdf (emphasis added).  
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has long promoted dialogue with the sports movement 
and has been at the forefront of encouraging social 
dialogue. Article 165 also adds impetus to efforts to 
move dialogue between the EU and the sports 
movement onto a more structured footing. However, 
given the diversity of the sports movement, structuring 
dialogue on a meaningful and inclusive basis is a 
significant challenge for the EU.70 
The slow development of social dialogue would not seem to be 
solely a structural issue, as advanced and sophisticated collective 
bargaining occurs in many parts of the sporting world, including in 
various sports in North America, Australia, and New Zealand as well 
as within European and world football.71 The issue is leverage, with the 
bargaining position of the athletes and their representatives being 
undermined by the recognition of sport’s apparently special nature 
without the condition that it be implemented with the requisite 
knowledge base obtained through social dialogue with the partners 
most affected and underpinned by the recognition of and respect for 
the rights of the players. 
B. “AN EMPLOYERS’ SYSTEM…” 
Underpinning the dominant position of ISOs is the fact that they 
are structured as cartels and often enjoy a monopoly position in the 
labour market for players. According to Braham Dabscheck, 
Australia’s leading academic on the industrial relations aspects of 
sport: 
The major reason why clubs act, or more correctly have 
acted, collectively is due to ‘the peculiar economics of 
professional team sports.’ Unlike other areas of 
economic life, sporting contests require the cooperation 
of competitors to create a product - namely, a game, or 
a series of games in a ‘regular’ competition...  
In addition to this, however, it has been argued that if a 
league is to generate interest, and enhance its income-
 
 70.  Id. at 7-8. 
 71.  See generally, Brendan Schwab, Collective Bargaining in Australian Professional 
Team Sports, ASSH Bulletin No. 29 (Dec. 1998); see also Daniel Pannett, Collective 
Bargaining in Sport: Challenges and Benefits, 4 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 189 
(2015); see also Ryan T. Dryer, Comment: Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. 
Disp. Resol. 267 (2008). 
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earning potential, it needs to maximise the uncertainty 
of the sporting competition…  
The major way in which clubs traditionally colluded 
was in the labour market. Various leagues, and their 
constituent clubs, developed employment rules which 
tied a player to the club he or she originally signed with 
and/or placed limits on their income ... Economists 
describe this situation, where a player can only 
negotiate with a single buyer, as a monopsony.72 
In simple terms, sporting organisations are structured so as to 
exercise great power in their dealings with athletes. In professional 
team sports, a wide range of controls over the movement of players 
have been employed from time to time, including: the retain and 
transfer system; the reserve clause; player drafts; zoning; permit rules; 
training compensation; home grown player rules; and salary caps.73 
These rules all place restrictions on the economic and sporting 
freedom of the players.  Accordingly, they may be in conflict with the 
common law doctrine of restraint of trade. In 1894 in Nordenfelt v. 
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition,74 Lord Macnaughten 
defined the restraint of trade doctrine as follows:  
The public have an interest in every person’s carrying 
on his trade freely; so has the individual. All 
interference with individual liberty of action in trading, 
and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is 
nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and 
therefore, void. But there are exceptions. Restraints of 
trade and interference with individual liberty of action, 
may be justified by the special circumstances of a 
particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and 
indeed, it is the only justification, if the restriction is 
reasonable – reasonable, that is, in reference to the 
interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in 
reference to the interests of the public, so framed and 
so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party 
in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it 
 
 72.  Braham Dabscheck, Industrial Relations in Australasian Professional Team 
Sports, 4, 30 Otemon J. of Australian Studies 3 (2004) available 
at https://www.otemon.ac.jp/research/labo/cas/publication/pdf/30/2.pdf. 
 73.  Id. at 11.  
 74.  See generally [1894] AC 535.  
4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/17  7:54 PM 
20 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:4 
is in no way injurious to the public.75 
The test under competition law is similar in the major sporting 
jurisdictions of the United States and Europe.76 Freedom of movement 
and contract are rights, but not absolute ones. Restrictions can be 
justified if they are designed to advance a legitimate interest, and go 
no further than is reasonably necessary in order to do so.  
The first major legal victory for free agency came over fifty years 
ago – in 1963 – when England international George Eastham and the 
Professional Footballers’ Association (“PFA”) challenged football’s 
retain and transfer system as being an unreasonable restraint of trade.77 
Eastham wanted to move from Newcastle United to Arsenal, and was 
out of contract. He refused to sign a new contract with Newcastle, but 
was “retained” by the club.   
Eastham learned this officially on 30 June 1960, the last day of 
his contract. He was not a playing, contracted, or paid member of 
Newcastle United; but he was ineligible to play for anyone else. On 13 
October 1960, he, with the backing of the PFA, began legal 
proceedings. Some five weeks later, his requested transfer was granted, 
for a fee of £47,000 (players could then earn a maximum of £20/week). 
By this stage, the whole affair had grown into a test case involving the 
basic rights of all professional footballers. Eastham allowed his case to 
be pressed to its conclusion.  
Mr. Justice Wilberforce declared that the retain and transfer 
system was an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore was not 
binding on Eastham. He referred to the administrators as “reasonable 
men whose attitude to their players was as much paternal as 
proprietary.” He said the retain and transfer system was: 
…an employers’ system, set up in an industry where the 
employers have succeeded in establishing a monolithic 
front all over the world, and where it is clear that for the 
purpose of negotiation the employers are vastly more 
strongly organized than the employees. No doubt the 
employers all over the world consider the system a 
 
 75.  Id. at 565. 
 76.  Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1890, 5 U.S.C. sections 1-7 and amended by the Clayton 
Act in 1914 (15 U.S.C. sections 12-27). 
 77.  Eastham v Newcastle United [1964] Ch. 413. See DAVID MCARDLE, FROM BOOT 
MONEY TO BOSMAN, FOOTBALL, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW (2000); Steve Tongue, Heart of the 
Union: Why the Modern Game Should Be Grateful to George Eastham, Independent (Jan. 14, 
2007) http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/heart-of-the-union-
why-the-modern-game-should-be-grateful-to-george-eastham-432060.html 
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good system, but this does not prevent the court from 
considering whether it goes further than is reasonably 
necessary to protect their legitimate interests.78 
Although fought as a question of competition law, the historic 
words of the athletes at the centre of these struggles resonate strongly 
with the language of human rights. For example, St. Louis Cardinals 
baseball player, Curt Flood, on 24 December 1969, wrote to Major 
League Baseball (“MLB”) Commissioner Bowie Kuhn: 
Dear Mr. Kuhn, 
After twelve years in the major leagues I do not feel that 
I am a piece of property to be bought and sold 
irrespective of my wishes.  I believe that any system 
that produces that result violates my rights as a citizen 
and is inconsistent with the laws of the United States 
and the several states. 
It is my desire to play baseball in 1970 and I am capable 
of playing.  I have received a contract from the 
Philadelphia club, but I believe I have the right to 
consider offers from other clubs before making any 
decisions.  I, therefore, request that you make known to 
all the major league clubs my feelings in this matter, 
and advise them of my availability for the 1970 
season.79 
In reply, Mr. Kuhn wrote: 
Dear Curt, 
. . . You have entered into a current playing contract 
with the St. Louis club, which has the same assignment 
provision as those in your annual major league 
contracts since 1956.   
I do not see what action I can take and I cannot comply 
with the request contained in…your letter…80 
Kuhn’s rejection of Flood, expected as it was, came in the midst 
 
 78.  Eastham v Newcastle United [1964] Ch. 413, at 438.  
 79.  National Archives Catalog, Letter to Bowie K. 
Kuhn, https://research.archives.gov/id/278312 (stating he had the right to consider offers from 
other baseball clubs before signing a contract) (DEC. 24, 1969). 
 80.  Id. 
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of an era of athletes fighting for the freedom to pursue their careers. 
While Flood was to lose his battle for free agency before the United 
States Supreme Court due to a combination of stare decisis and 
anomalous precedent from the 1920s,81 MLB players would ultimately 
win free agency in the 1970s.82 In jurisdictions as spread as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union, the 
fundamental right of players to pursue their profession with liberty and 
freedom would be judicially recognised.83 
Balmain and Australian rugby league international Dennis Tutty 
challenged the New South Wales Rugby League’s equivalent of 
football’s retain and transfer system in Buckley v Tutty.84 Like 
Eastham, Tutty’s contract with Balmain had expired and he could not 
play anywhere else unless Balmain gave him permission to do so.85  
The High Court of Australia extended the Eastham decision by 
looking beyond the retention aspect of the system and at the impact of 
transfer fees, stating that: 
In our opinion the rules now under consideration go 
beyond what is reasonable in two main respects. In the 
first place, they enable a club to prevent any 
professional who has played in one of its teams from 
playing with another club, notwithstanding that he has 
ceased to play for the club which retains him and no 
longer receives any remuneration from that club.  
…A second objection to the rules in their present form 
is in relation to the question of transfer fees. Although 
a club does not wish to retain a player, and is prepared 
to see him go to another club, it may fix a transfer fee, 
 
 81.  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 282, 258 (1972); id. at 290.  
 82.  Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Major League Baseball 
Players Association, Defendant, Golden West Baseball Company et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors, 
409 F.Supp. 233 (1976).   
 83.  See supra notes 77 to 82; see infra notes 84 to 95; see generally Robertson v. National 
Basketball Association 389 F.Supp. 867 (1975); Greig and others v. Insole and others: World 
Series Cricket Pty. Ltd. v. same. [1977 G. No. 2246] 1977 J. No. 4876]; John Mackey et al., 
v. National Football League et al., 543 F.2d 606; McNeil v. National Football League 790 
F.Supp. 871 (1992). 
 84.  [1971] HCA 71 363. 
 85.  Braham Dabscheck, Righting a Wrong: Dennis Tutty and His Struggle Against the 
New South Wales Rugby League, 4 Australian & New Zealand Sports L.J. 145, 151-52 
(2009), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ANZSportsLawJl/2009/7.pdf; 
Braham Dabscheck, Industrial Relations in Australasian Professional Team Sports, 
30 Otemon J. of Australian Studies 3, 4 (2004), available 
at https://www.otemon.ac.jp/research/labo/cas/publication/pdf/30/2.pdf.  
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most of which goes to the club itself, although it may 
be quite unrelated to any benefit which the player has 
received from his membership of or association with 
the club…It is no answer to say that the transfer fee may 
be fixed by reference to what it would cost the club to 
obtain another player equally skillful, for this is only 
another way of saying that an employer may restrain an 
employee from working elsewhere unless he is 
compensated for the loss of his services. In this respect 
also the restraint imposed by the rules goes further than 
is necessary to protect the reasonable interests of the 
League and its members.86 
Sport’s employment rules returned to the High Court of Australia 
again in the early 1990s because of a labour dispute in the New South 
Wales Rugby League.87 Unlike Tutty, the Adamson case was a class 
action coordinated by the Association of Rugby League Professionals 
and its former player and barrister President, Kevin Ryan. At question, 
rugby league’s newly introduced internal draft. At first instance, Mr. 
Justice Hill found the restraint to be reasonable.88 The Full Court of the 
Federal Court allowed the players’ appeal and dealt with the matter 
succinctly; in the words of Mr. Justice Wilcox: “…the right to choose 
between prospective employers is a fundamental element of a free 
society. It is the existence of this right which separates the free person 
from the serf.”89 
In 1995 in the European Court of Justice came arguably the most 
important sports law decision of all time. The Bosman ruling has 
revolutionised football.90 The case, funded by FIFPro,91 challenged 
football’s training compensation and transfer system and the 
imposition of quotas on foreign players within European professional 
leagues.92  The legal case was based on the then Article 39 of the Treaty 
 
 86.  Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353 at 378  
 87.  See Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Limited [1991] FCA 8. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.   Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Limited [1991] FCA 425, paragraph 60 
per Wilcox J.. 
 90.  See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge Des Societes de Football Ass’n and Others 
v. Bosman and Others, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921.  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61993CJ0415. 
 91.  FIFPro World Players’ Union, https://www.fifpro.org/en/about-fifpro/about-fifpro. 
(Noting FIFPro is short for the Federation Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs 
Professionnels. According to FIFPro’s website, “FIFPro is the worldwide representative 
organisation for all professional footballers”). 
 92.  Dr. Geoff Pearson, Fact-Sheet One: The Bosman Case, 
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Establishing the European Community: 
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured 
within the Community. 
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition 
of any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and 
employment. 
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified 
on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health: 
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made; 
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States 
for this purpose; 
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of 
employment in accordance with the provisions 
governing the employment of nationals of that State 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; 
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after 
having been employed in that State, subject to 
conditions which shall be embodied in implementing 
regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.93 
Advocate General Lenz, on the quota system, stated in Bosman: 
No deep cogitation is required to reach the conclusion 
that the rules on foreign players are of a discriminatory 
nature. They represent an absolutely classic case of 
discrimination on the ground of nationality. Those rules 
limit the number of players from other Member States 
whom a club in a particular Member State can play in a 
match. Those players are thereby placed at a 
disadvantage with access to employment, compared 
with players who are nationals of that Member State.94 
 
http://fru.merseyside.org/bosman.htm. 
 93.  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra, note 66 and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002 (C 325/01) 51. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12002E%2FTXT.  
 94.  Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societies de Football Association and others 
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On the compensation system, Lenz stated: 
…that presupposes precisely that a player can be 
regarded as a sort of merchandise for which a price is 
to be paid. Such an attitude may correspond to today’s 
reality, as characterized by the transfer rules, in which 
the ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ of players is indeed spoken 
of. That reality must not blind us to the fact that this is 
an attitude which has no legal basis and is not 
compatible with the right to freedom of movement ... I 
also have considerable doubt as to whether a system 
which ultimately amounts to treating players as 
merchandise is liable to promote the sporting ethos…95 
C. INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ARBITRATION AND ‘LEX 
SPORTIVA’ 
The modern legal and political recognition of the notions of the 
specificity and autonomy of sport96 have enabled ISOs to establish a 
legally binding institutional framework that upholds rules that the sport 
regards as important even where they may be counter to recognised 
rights under international and domestic law. This has been made 
possible through the use of arbitration clauses in the contracts signed 
by athletes as a condition of their participation in sport, coupled with 
an institutional condemnation of sporting participants who seek access 
to judicial remedies. This has allowed, for example, for the 
continuation and growth of a market based player transfer system and 
its expansion to third party interests despite the ruling of the European 
Court of Justice in Bosman.97 
Those participating in sport under the auspices of the IOC or 
another ISO are almost always required to ultimately have sports or 
labour related disputes determined by the Court of Arbitration for 
 
v. Bosman and others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Int’l Olympic Comm., Historic Milestone: United Nations Recognises Autonomy 
of Sport, (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.olympic.org/news/historic-milestone-united-nations-
recognises-autonomy-of-sport.  See generally, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, supra, note 66.  
 97.  See generally, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] March 27, 2012, 
4A_558/2011, 
http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/sites/default/files/27%20mars%202012%204A%2
055.  See also Matuzalem Case: CAS Decision Fully Backs FIFA Regulations, FIFA.com 
(May 20, 2009) http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2009/m=5/news=matuzalem-case-
cas-decision-fully-backs-fifa-regulations-1060323.html. 
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Sport (“CAS”), which is headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland.98  
Chapter 6 of the Olympic Charter deals with “Measures and 
Sanctions, Disciplinary Procedures and Dispute Resolution.”99 It 
provides for a wide range of measures and sanctions where the 
Olympic Charter and regulations promulgated by the IOC and 
recognised bodies in advancement of the Charter have been 
breached.100 Measures and sanctions may be taken against members of 
the Olympic Movement including IOC members, international 
sporting federations, national Olympic committees, host cities, 
Olympic organising committees, candidate cities, and other recognised 
associations and organisations.101 The sanctions include withdrawal 
from the Olympic Games (including from a sport, event or a 
discipline), suspensions, withdrawal of recognition, and reprimands.102 
Further, the right to host the Olympic Games can be withdrawn.103  
Rule 61 deals with the resolution of any disputes arising from the 
Olympic Charter in clear terms: 
1. The decisions of the IOC are final. Any dispute 
relating to their application or interpretation may be 
resolved solely by the IOC Executive Board and, in 
certain cases, by arbitration before the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 
2. Any dispute arising on the occasion of, or in 
connection with, the Olympic Games shall be 
submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related 
Arbitration.104 
FIFA similarly recognises CAS, including in relation to disputes 
“between FIFA, member associations, confederations, leagues, clubs, 
players, officials, intermediaries and licensed match agents.”105 The 
 
 98.  See generally COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2017). 
 99.  Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter at 101–105 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. 
 100.  See generally Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 59.1.6 at 102 (effective Aug. 2, 
2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. 
 104.  Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 61 at 105 (effective Aug. 2, 
2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. 
 105.  FIFA Statutes, supra note 39, Article 57.1 at 54. 
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FIFA Statutes, as amended in February 2016, provide that “CAS shall 
primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, 
Swiss law.”106 Article 59 of the FIFA Statutes further provides that: 
confederations, member associations, and leagues shall recognise 
CAS; recourse to ordinary courts is prohibited unless specifically 
provided for in FIFA regulations; and member associations must insert 
a clause in their statutes or regulations that it is prohibited for disputes 
including between clubs and players to be resolved in the ordinary 
courts of law.107  
On the issue of arbitration at the regional or national level, article 
59.3 of the FIFA Statutes provides that, “[i]nstead of recourse to 
ordinary courts of law, provision shall be made for arbitration. Such 
disputes shall be taken to an independent and duly constituted 
arbitration tribunal under the rules of the association or confederation 
or to CAS.”108 
Likewise, the 2015 WADA Code provides that “in cases arising 
from participation in an International Event or in cases involving 
International-Level Athletes, the decision may be exclusively appealed 
to CAS.”109 
The legal effect of sports arbitration has been profound and 
allowed ISOs to once again unilaterally regulate the global labour 
markets for players. In a 2016 paper on the development of football’s 
labour market regulations following the Bosman decision, legal 
academic Antoine Duval wrote: 
Thanks to the accommodating stance of Swiss 
arbitration law towards the use of transnational private 
rules in international arbitration, the CAS is in practice 
disregarding national law when adjudicating on 
disputes based on the FIFA Regulations for the Status 
and Transfer of Players (FIFA RSTP). Consequently, 
the FIFA RSTP is very much the only source of law 
applying to disputes linked with international transfers 
and contracts of football players (and coaches).110 
 
 106.  Id. Article 57.2 at 54. 
 107.  Id. Article 59 at 55. 
 108.  Id. Article 59.3 at 55. 
 109.  World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA] World Anti-Doping Code, Article 13.2.1 at 82 
(Effective Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/wada-2015-world-anti-
doping-code.pdf. (emphasis added). 
 110.  Antoine Duval, The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Trans-
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The consequence is the emergence of lex sportiva, a transnational 
law of sport produced by ISOs and the CAS that is now attracting 
considerable academic interest.111 Duval argues that: 
…this new legal theoretical perspective must be taken 
into account when analysing the Bosman ruling of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and its 
aftermath. In other words, the legal and political effects 
of the Bosman ruling must be understood as a specific 
move in a complex transnational political and legal 
game.112 
An important question is whether lex sportiva is a legitimate 
source of law. Duval identifies the problem: 
In the absence of international rules imposed conjointly 
by national states, the football world has developed, in 
the shadow of Bosman and Swiss arbitration law, a 
specific ‘global law without the state’. A global law 
which is not the product of a global democracy but of a 
messy, invisible, political process involving a plurality 
of actors representing a conflicting set of interests. This 
obviously raises burning questions of legitimacy, which 
go way beyond the scope of the present article. To point 
out the prevalence of this peculiar and influential set of 
private rules is already an important step in critically 
engaging with this particular dimension of the 
problem.113 
For lex sportiva to be legitimate as a system of law, it must, at a 
minimum, respect and fulfil the fundamental human rights of the 
people who are the subject of that law – the players.114 The CAS, 
however, was specifically established to deal with sports related 
disputes, not matters of human rights.115 As Professor Ruggie noted in 
National Law Making in the Shadow of Bosman, ASSER INST. (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760263. 
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally Dimitrios P. Panagiotopoulos, Lex Sportiva and International
Legitimacy Governing: Protection of Professional Players, 8 U.S. China L. Rev. 121 (2011). 
See also supra note 110.  
115. See generally COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-
information/frequently-asked-questions.html. 
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his report to FIFA: 
If an arbitration system is going to deal effectively with 
human rights-related complaints, it needs certain 
procedural and substantive protections to be able to 
deliver on that promise. While the FIFA dispute 
resolution system and the CAS’ 300-plus arbitrators 
who sit at the peak of the system may be well equipped 
to resolve a great variety of football-related disputes, 
they generally lack human rights expertise.116 
Further, should the arbitral system fail to respect the human rights 
of the players, there are considerable barriers to them accessing a 
judicial remedy. In addition to the legal constraints already noted, there 
are substantial political and practical ones.117 Professor Ruggie referred 
to these when reporting to FIFA on a case involving alleged gender 
discrimination:  
While FIFA’s regulations contain formal exceptions to 
the prohibition of legal claims, in practice the system 
seems more like a closed loop. For example, players 
from several countries participating in the 2015 
Women’s World Cup in Canada filed a complaint with 
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario on grounds of 
gender discrimination. Clearly, they were not prevented 
from accessing a public tribunal. But when they did so, 
they were allegedly threatened with suspension from 
their teams and from participating in the Cup…(I)n 
cases that raise significant human rights issues, the 
ability for players to access effective remedy—
including, where they so choose, through domestic 
courts or tribunals—must be a real and not merely a 
theoretical possibility.118 
Duval also commented on this, stating: “Even if de jure players 
… have the possibility to bring their disputes in front of national courts, 
de facto their careers are too short to be wasted on intricate and 
uncertain legal battles.”119 
 
 116.  For the Game. For the World.  FIFA and Human Rights, supra note 28 at 26. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Trans-National Law 
Making in the Shadow of Bosman, supra, note 110.  
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III. THE VOICE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLAYERS 
A. NORMALISATION OF THE RIGHT OF PLAYERS TO 
ORGANISE 
The effort on the part of professional athletes to exercise their 
fundamental rights under international labour standards to organise 
and form unions for the protection of their interests is now becoming 
common place. On one “imperfect”120 but well researched estimate: 
…in 1973 there were eleven sports which had formed 
player bodies, spread across 25 nations with the 
majority of both concentrated in Europe and North 
America. Since then, there has been a dramatic increase 
in player associations in numerous sports. As of 
November 2016, there are 226 player organisations 
(174 player associations and 52 independent 
contractors) operating in 35 sports and 86 
countries/national groupings. Five associations 
emerged in 2016 alone…In terms of player bodies as a 
whole, this is an increase of 461 percent; for player 
associations, an increase of exactly 600 per cent, and 
260 per cent for independent contractors.121 
International sport is continuing to see the emergence of global 
player associations, including in sports which conduct some of the 
world’s most prestigious and lucrative MSEs. For example, FIFPro, 
the world footballers’ association, represents approximately 65,000 
professional footballers through national player associations in over 
sixty countries, whilst the International Rugby Players’ Association 
(“IRPA”) and the Federation of International Cricketers’ Associations 
(“FICA”) respectively represent the vast majority of the world’s 
professional rugby players and cricketers in the same manner.122 The 
World Players Association (“World Players”), established in 
December 2014 as an autonomous sector of the UNI Global Union, 
represents over 85,000 professional athletes through FIFPro, FICA, 
IRPA, EU Athletes, the NFLPA, the National Hockey League Players 
 
 120.  Braham Dabscheck, Forming Teams of their Own: the Dramatic Emergence of 
Player Associations Across the Globe, 26 January 2017, LawInSport, 
https://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/forming-teams-of-their-own-the-dramatic-
emergence-of-player-associations-across-the-globe  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  FIFPRO WORLD PLAYERS’ UNION https://www.fifpro.org/en/about-fifpro/about-fifpro; 
IRPA http://irpa-rugby.com/; FICA FED’N OF INT’L CRICKETERS’ ASS’NS 
http://www.thefica.com/about/ (last visited May 11, 2017).  
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Association (“NHLPA”), the National Basketball Players Association 
(“NBPA”), the Japanese Professional Baseball Players Association 
(“JPBPA”), and the Australian Athletes’ Alliance (“AAA”).123 
Together, these bodies comprise more than 100 national player 
associations in over sixty countries.124  
The growth in player unionism at the national, regional and global 
levels clearly has important implications for world sport. It will have 
to develop the capacity to deal with rising unionisation density with its 
most valuable workforce at a time when unionisation around the world 
is in decline. According to Dabscheck: 
…the growth in both the number of player associations 
and their coalescing into federations/confederations is 
interesting from a sports perspective, but is of more 
significance for industrial relations scholars. Both of 
these developments are in the opposite direction to that 
which has occurred in traditional or mainstream 
industrial relations. The ability of traditional unions to 
organise and represent workers has been in decline in 
response to the forces of neo-liberalism as enshrined in 
aggressive stances by employers, governments and 
state institutions. Between 1975, a year after Scoville 
made his observation and 2014, the percentage of 
workers who are members of unions in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
countries has fallen from 47 to 16.7 per cent. And neo-
liberalism has made it difficult, if not impossible for 
unions to organise globally to defend the wages and 
working conditions of members. Unions have been in 
decline; but not in the increasingly varied world of 
sports.125 
The player unions are also express in their commitment to 
ensuring the application of internationally recognised human rights to 
the work of their members, and emphasise that they operate 
independently and democratically. The Nyon Declaration of 
November 2011, which was made following a meeting of global, 
regional, national and individual player associations held in the offices 
 
 123.  UNI Global Union, THE WORLD PLAYERS’ ASS’N, 
http://uniglobalunion.org/sectors/sport/worldplayersassociation (last visited May 2017). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Forming Teams of their Own: the Dramatic Emergence of Player Associations 
Across the Globe, supra, note 120.  
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of UNI Global Union, reads: 
We, the independent and democratically elected 
representatives of (thousands of) top athletes from 
around the world, today establish a federation of world 
player associations. 
We take this action based on certain core principles and 
to address a crisis in the governance of world sport 
organisations that have removed the athlete from the 
center of sport. There is no sport without athletes… 
We declare that world sport organisations, and 
governments, must respect national and international 
law as well as the fundamental rights of athletes as 
citizens and workers, including the right to organise 
collectively in player associations and unions… 
We stand for the equal treatment of all athletes 
regardless of their ethnic background, religion, gender 
or sexual orientation…126 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
CONFRONTING PLAYERS 
Players, like everyone, need government and business to act to 
ensure that their human rights are protected and respected. Even with 
the UNGPs applying to ISOs as multi-national enterprises of 
considerable scale and scope,127 the present circumstances confronting 
players identify at least three broad areas of human rights risk which 
this paper will consider. 
(1) The Right to Organise and Collectively Bargain 
Despite the central role of the players in the delivery of sport and 
the normalisation of unionisation, they are commonly denied the right 
to organise and collectively bargain. Most notably, there is an 
institutional preference on the part of many ISOs, including the IOC, 
to regulate the mode of athlete representation within the sporting 
framework without regard to ILO standards.128  
 
 126.  Nyon Declaration (Nov. 15, 2011) 
http://www.uniglobalunion.org/sites/default/files/imce/world_players_2011_nyon_declaratio
n.pdf.  
 127.  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9. 
 128.  Mega-Sporting Events Platform for Human Rights, Athletes’ Rights and Mega-
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There are two broad models of athlete representation in relation 
to ISOs and MSEs: (1) the mode of athlete consultation is regulated by 
the ISO;129 and (2) the ISO recognises and negotiates with a players’ 
association which operates at the global level, and facilitates and 
encourages negotiations between employers and player unions as well 
as other interested stakeholders, both under the regulations of the sport 
and relevant labour law.130 This may even see a MSE being conducted 
as a joint venture between employers and the players’ association. 
(a) ISO Regulated Athlete Consultation 
Made up of sixteen current and former Olympic athletes, the IOC 
Athletes’ Commission is established pursuant to Rule 21 of the 
Olympic Charter and provides the vehicle for consultation with 
athletes within the Olympic Movement.131 Administratively supported 
by the IOC sports department, the Athletes’ Commission’s mission:   
is to ensure that the athletes’ viewpoint remains at the 
heart of the Olympic Movement decisions. To that 
effect, the Commission is invited by the IOC President 
to submit proposals, recommendations and/or reports to 
the IOC Executive Board or the IOC Session. In a next 
step, the Commission develops toolkits, guidelines and 
projects to support athletes on and off the field of play. 
The Commission members have representation (on) all 
relevant IOC commissions, including the IOC 
Executive Board, subject to the applicable rules of the 
Olympic Charter.132 
Significantly, the responsibilities of the IOC Athletes’ 
Commission include, within the IOC, to “(r)epresent athletes 
throughout the Olympic Movement and give input on activities related 
to the implementation of Olympic Agenda 2020, specifically focusing 
on protecting and supporting clean athletes, both on and off the field 
of play…”133 Further, within the Olympic Movement the Athletes’ 
 
Sporting Events, SPORTING CHANCE WHITE PAPER 4.2 (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.ihrb.org/uploads/reports/MSE_Platform%2C_Athletes_Rights_and_Mega-
Sporting_Events%2C_Jan._2017.pdf. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 21 at 51 (effective Aug. 2, 
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.  See also Athletes’ 
Commission, OLYMPICS, https://www.olympic.org/athletes-commission.  
 132.  Athletes’ Commission, OLYMPICS, https://www.olympic.org/athletes-commission.   
 133.  Id.  
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Commission is responsible for “[l]ead[ing] the Athletes’ Engagement 
Strategy to liaise, communicate and engage with athletes worldwide . 
. . include[ing] developing the Olympic Athletes’ Hub, and being 
present at the Olympic Games and Youth Olympic Games to interact 
with athletes, as well as liaising with relevant IOC Recognised 
Organisations such as International Federations, WADA, the IPC, 
WOA, ANOC, Continental Associations, CAS and others…”134 
The Olympic Charter encourages the development of athlete 
commissions throughout the Olympic Movement. For example, the 
existence of an athletes’ commission within an ISO or National 
Olympic Committee is relevant to the question of IOC membership.135 
The Athletes’ Commission Charter of the Australian Olympic 
Committee (“AOC”), for example, provides that the commission’s role 
is to “advise” the executive of the AOC and obliges each member of 
the commission not to act in the best interests of the athletes or even 
sport, but “solely in the best interests of the Committee (i.e. the AOC) 
and its members as a whole.”136  
WADA similarly, has established an athletes’ committee. The 
stated role of the seventeen person body is to “serve as the voice of 
clean athletes, encouraging integrity and fairness for sport and 
athletes.”137 The objectives and key activities of the committee include 
providing “insight to and feedback on the World Anti-Doping Program 
including the Code, testing standards, ADAMS etc.” and acting as 
“ambassadors and spokespersons for WADA and doping-free sport.”138 
It is appointed by the Committee’s chair and the President of WADA 
in consultation with WADA’s Director General.139 The committee’s 
terms of reference further provide: 
Confidentiality. All Committee members are required 
to sign a confidentiality agreement upon appointment.  
Communications and Media. All members must read 
and agree to comply with WADA’s Media Relations 
 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 2.3.4 at 41 (effective Aug. 2, 
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. 
 136. Austl. Olympic Comm., Athletes’ Commission Charter, (Aug. 6, 2015), http://aoc-
cdn.s3.amazonaws.com/corporate/live/files/dmfile/Athletes%20Commission%20Charter_6
%20August%202015.pdf (emphasis added). 
 137.  World Anti-Doping Agency, Athlete Committee, (Dec., 2014), https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-athlete-committee-terms-of-reference-
2014.pdf. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/17  7:54 PM 
2017]      WHEN WE KNOW BETTER, WE DO BETTER 35 
policy (as attached). If a member should receive a 
request for an interview in relation to their role in 
WADA or WADA’s work in the fight against doping in 
sport, they should consult first with the WADA Media 
Relations Senior Manager or (if absent), with the 
WADA Communications Director. 
Funding Support. WADA shall provide the necessary 
administration and operational resources for 
Committee meetings.140 
(b) World Player Associations  
Established in 1965, FIFPro is the most developed world players’ 
union. Under the terms of a memorandum of understanding signed in 
2006, it is exclusively recognised by FIFA as the representative body 
of the world’s professional footballers.141 Similarly, FIFPro recognises 
FIFA as football’s international governing body.142  The cooperation 
between FIFA and FIFPro includes: 
• FIFA committing to negotiate all changes to international 
regulations that affect player transfers, contracts and 
registrations FIFA RSTP, and agreeing not to implement any 
changes without FIFPro’s agreement.143 
• An international dispute resolution mechanism (the FIFA 
Dispute Resolution Chamber) to resolve employment related 
disputes between clubs and players, with FIFPro nominating 
50% of the arbitrators.144   
• FIFPro representation within key committees, such as the FIFA 
Players’ Status Committee and the FIFA Stakeholders 
Committee.145   
• FIFPro working with FIFA’s confederations, including the 
Union of European Football Associations (“UEFA”), where a 
formal European social dialogue has been established under the 
 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Memorandum of Understanding, FIFPRO (Nov. 2, 2006), 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/sportslaw-webroot/cms/documents/cms_sports_id78_1_FIFPro-
MOU-FinalSig2-E-20061102%5b1%5d.pdf. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See generally Players’ Status Committee, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/committees/committee=1882032/index.html (last visited). 
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auspices of the European Commission to address matters such 
as minimum contract requirements for players.146 A four party 
autonomous agreement was concluded in 2012 on this subject 
between FIFPro’s European division, the European Club 
Association (“ECA”), the European Professional Football 
Leagues (“EPFL”) and UEFA.147  
As this paper will consider, the relationship between FIFPro and 
FIFA is not without its challenges, especially on the key issues of the 
player transfer system, the protection of player wages and dispute 
resolution. For example, FIFPro has supported efforts by athletes to 
access remedies through litigation and formal processes. It is 
supporting German speed skater Claudia Pechstein’s legal challenge 
to the CAS,148 and in 2015 filed a complaint in the European 
Commission against the anti-competitive effect of the operation of the 
FIFA RSTP.149  
World Rugby also recognises IRPA, the International Rugby 
Players’ Association.150 The admission of Rugby Sevens into the 
Olympic Games resulted in the establishment of a rugby athletes’ 
commission in accordance with IOC requirements through an 
agreement between World Rugby and IRPA.151 Among the 
commission’s highest priorities is the advancement of the relationship 
 
 146.  Memorandum of Understanding, FIFPRO (Nov. 2, 2006), 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/sportslaw-webroot/cms/documents/cms_sports_id78_1_FIFPro-
MOU-FinalSig2-E-20061102%5b1%5d.pdf. 
 147.  See Press Release, FIFPro, FIFPRO, UEFA, ECA, EPFL Sign Minimum 
Requirements (April 19, 2012) https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-uefa-eca-epfl-sign-
minimum-requirements/en/. See also Press Release, European Commission, Andor and Platini 
Welcome New Agreement on Contract Rights for Footballers (April 19, 2012) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-267_en.htm?locale=en.  See also Press 
Release, European Commission, New Agreement on Contract Rights for Footballers (April 
19, 2012) 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=fr&catId=329&newsId=1279&furtherNews=yes. 
 148.  FIFPro Backs Claudia Pechstein’s Legal Battle, FIFPRO (July 14, 2015) 
https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-backs-claudia-pechstein-s-legal-battle/en/.   
 149.  See FIFPro’s EU competition law complaint – executive summary, FIFPRO (Sept. 18, 
2015), 
https://www.fifpro.org/attachments/article/6156/FIFPro%20Complaint%20Executive%20Su
mmary.pdf. Juan de Dios Crespo Perez & Paolo Torchetti, A Legal and Policy Analysis of 
FIFPro’s Proposal to Reform the Regulation of Professional Football Contracts, 
WHO’SWHOLEGAL (Nov. 2015) http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/32715/a-legal-
policy-analysis-fifpros-proposal-reform-regulation-professional-football-contracts. 
 150.  Daniel Etchells, World Rugby and IRPA Strengthen Ties at Athletes’ Commission, 
INSIDE THE GAMES (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1031850/world-
rugby-and-irpa-strengthen-ties-at-athletes-commission. 
 151.  IRPA Player Representatives Follow up on 2015 Rugby Athletes’ Commission, IRPA 
(2015), http://irpa-rugby.com/news/.   
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between World Rugby and IRPA through a “joint commitment to 
developing (a) revised memorandum of understanding between World 
Rugby and IRPA to provide a stronger blueprint of collaboration on 
international issues affecting players and the game as a whole.”152 
The World Cup of Hockey 2016 in Toronto, Canada, featured 
eight teams competing for a best-on-best international hockey 
championship: Team Canada, Team Czech Republic, Team Finland, 
Team Russia, Team Sweden, Team USA, Team Europe and Team 
North America.153 More than 150 of the best players in the National 
Hockey League (“NHL”) participated in this tournament.154 The 
tournament was a joint effort of the NHLPA and NHL, in cooperation 
with the International Ice Hockey Federation (“IIHF”).155 The 
tournament was played on NHL-sized rinks using NHL rules and 
officiated by NHL officials.156 Other competition matters – such as the 
anti-doping policy governing the tournament, the framework and 
procedure for supplementary discipline, the medical protocols, media 
and broadcasting policies and access, etc. – were the responsibility of 
the NHL and NHLPA in consultation with third parties, including the 
IIHF, where appropriate.157  
Article 24 of the 2012 – 2022 Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(“CBA”) between the NHL and NHLPA deals with international 
hockey under the auspices of a joint “international committee.”158 The 
CBA relevantly provides in Article 24.5: 
The NHL and the NHLPA shall continue to work 
together to jointly create and exploit other international 
projects and initiatives involving NHL Players other 
than International Hockey Games, including games, 
series, events or contests (e.g., the World Cup of 
Hockey, European Champions’ League, Victoria Cup 
Competition, Olympic participation, etc.). All revenues 
from such projects and initiatives (net of expenses 
 
 152.   Id.  
 153.  WORLD CUP OF HOCKEY 2016, https://www.wch2016.com/info/teams.  
 154.  World Cup of Hockey 2016 Rosters Finalized, NHLPA (May 27, 2016), 
http://www.nhlpa.com/news/world-cup-of-hockey-2016-rosters-finalized. 
 155.  2016 World Cup: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD CUP OF HOCKEY 2016, 
https://www.wch2016.com/info/world-cup-of-hockey-faq. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Collective Bargaining Agreement between National Hockey League and National 
Hockey League Players’ Association, Feb. 15, 2013, 
http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf. 
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incurred pursuant to budgets approved by the 
International Committee, including without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, Direct Costs and NHL and 
NHLPA staffing costs) shall be excluded from [Hockey 
Related Revenues] pursuant to Section 50.1(b)(xviii) 
and divided equally between the NHL and NHLPA.159 
Similar to Hockey, the CBA between the MLB and the Major 
League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) deals with 
“international play.”160 Article XXV(K)(4) of the CBA provides that 
all international play is subject to joint cooperation between MLB, the 
MLBPA, and the MLB clubs.161 The World Baseball Classic, 
baseball’s world championship of nations, is conducted by the World 
Baseball Classic, Inc. (“WBCI”), a company created at the direction of 
MLB and the MLBPA to operate the World Baseball Classic 
tournament.162 The tournament, which is sanctioned by the World 
Baseball Softball Confederation (“WBSC”), is supported by MLB, the 
MLBPA, Nippon Professional Baseball (“NPB”), the Korea Baseball 
Organization (“KBO”), their respective players’ associations and other 
leagues and players from around the world.163  
(2) The Regulation of Player and Athlete Rights
The prevalence given by ISOs to notions such as the autonomy
and specificity of sport when addressing the rights of athletes and 
players across sport should be measured in the light of the 
extraordinary and far-reaching complexity of athlete regulation as 
developed by ISOs, and the difficulties athletes confront in having 
their rights upheld, and in accessing an effective remedy where they 
are breached. The extent of athlete regulation is illustrated by the Index 
of Athletes Rights & Rules published by the United States Olympic 
Committee (“USOC”) Athlete Ombudsman.164 The twelve page index 
cites U.S. sports specific legislation, the USOC Bylaws, the Olympic 
Charter, the WADA Code (and related documents), the requirements 
159. Id.
160. 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (last 
visited May 11, 2017). 
161. Id.
162. About the 2017 World Baseball Classic, WORLDBASEBALLCLASSIC,
https://www.worldbaseballclassic.com/info/about (last visited May 11, 2016). 
163. Id.
164. USOC Athlete Ombudsman, Index of Athletes’ Rights & Rules, U.S. OLYMPIC 
COMM., http://www.teamusa.org/~/media/TeamUSA/Documents/Athlete-
Ombudsman/Athlete-Rights/Index-of-Athletes-Rights-2.pdf?la=en (last visited May 11, 
2017).
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of the United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”), USOC policies 
(which address matters such as the commercial rights and obligations 
of athletes, and what performance apparel they may wear), selection 
procedures, dispute resolution, arbitration, athlete participation in 
governance matters and political matters, among other things.165   
Similarly, to participate in the 2016 Rio Olympics, Australian 
athletes were required to sign a sixty page “partnership agreement” 
with the AOC.166 The agreement is legally controversial. It denies the 
existence of an employment relationship between the athletes and the 
AOC,167 contains onerous provisions regarding the disclosure of 
information, denies the athlete recourse to the courts, imposes 
restraints on how the athlete may conduct commercial activities and 
requires the athlete to release and indemnify the AOC on broad 
terms.168 Payment to the athlete is not provided, although some athletes 
may access funding through various sport and government 
programs.169 The agreement incorporates by reference eight external 
documents (themselves legally complex), including the AOC 
Constitution, AOC guidelines and bylaws on funding, commercial 
activities and selection, the Olympic Charter, the WADA Code and the 
IOC Code of Ethics, the latter of which effectively requires all athletes 
to waive their data protection rights as a condition of participation in 
the Olympics.170 The front page of the agreement reads: 
Your selection to participate in the 2016 Olympic 
Games as a member of the 2016 Australian Olympic 
Team is conditional on you entering into this 
165. Id.
166. Team Membership Agreement – Athletes, AUSTL. OLYMPIC COMM., http://aoc-
rio2016.s3.amazonaws.com/files/dmfile/ATHLETES%20-
%202016%20Australian%20Olympic%20Team%20Membership%20Agreement%20-
%20FINAL%20w%20Schedules_201015.pdf (last visited May 11, 2016). 
167. See generally, Sahinovic v. Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse, Das 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Magistrates’ Court of Appeal, Vienna, Austria] March 10, 2017 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/ (last visited July 1, 2017). 
168. Team Membership Agreement – Athletes, AUSTL. OLYMPIC COMM., http://aoc-
rio2016.s3.amazonaws.com/files/dmfile/ATHLETES%20-
%202016%20Australian%20Olympic%20Team%20Membership%20Agreement%20-
%20FINAL%20w%20Schedules_201015.pdf (last visited May 11, 2016). 
169. See generally Dr. Rhonda Jolly, Sports Funding: Federal Balancing Act, Parliament 
of Austl. (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar 
y/pubs/BN/2012-2013/SportFunding. 
170. Team Membership Agreement – Athletes, AUSTL. OLYMPIC COMM., http://aoc-
rio2016.s3.amazonaws.com/files/dmfile/ATHLETES%20-
%202016%20Australian%20Olympic%20Team%20Membership%20Agreement%20-
%20FINAL%20w%20Schedules_201015.pdf (last visited May 11, 2016). 
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Agreement and observing its terms. 
You should carefully read this Agreement so as to 
understand its terms and the consequences flowing 
from any breach of its terms.171 
(3) The Widespread Failure to Respect Player Rights
In the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, football has a
grievance mechanism for the resolution of international labour 
disputes between clubs and players.172 However, professional 
footballers still have great difficulty in having their labour rights 
upheld throughout the world. FIFPro has undertaken extensive 
research into the systematic violation of the fundamental rights of 
players. For example, in November 2016, FIFPro published the results 
of a survey of the working conditions of 14,000 professional athletes.173 
It has uncovered many troubling realities faced by players below the 
narrow summit of world football. The survey findings show that: 21% 
of players are making less than $300 a month, 45% of players make 
less than $1,000 a month and 74% of players less than $4,000 a month; 
32% of players experience very significant delays in the payment of 
their salaries; 14% are forced into bogus self-employment; 8% 
experienced discrimination in the workplace based on ethnicity, 
religion, sexual orientation or other reasons; 14% experience threats 
by fans, club management or other people associated with their 
employer; and 10% of players have not completed education beyond 
the primary school level.174  
Similar findings were revealed in two earlier research reports, the 
2012 FIFPro Black Book, Eastern Europe175 and the 2015 FIFPro Asia 
Buku Hitam, an unpublished study into issues confronting professional 
footballers in Asia and Oceania, including Australia, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Palestine, Singapore 
and South Korea.176 Both pieces of research involved extensive player 
171. Id.
172. See generally Governance. Players’ status and transfers. Dispute resolution
chamber, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/dispute-resolution-system/index.html (last 
visited June 25, 2017). 
173. See generally 2016 FIFPRO Global Employment Report Working Conditions in
Professional Football, FIFPRO WORLD PLAYERS’ UNION,
https://fifpro.org/images/documents-pdf/2016-fifpro-global-employment-report.pdf (2016). 
174. Id.
175. See generally FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe the Problems Professional
Footballers Encounter: Research, FIFPRO (2012), https://www.fifpro.org/images/documents-
pdf/BLACK-BOOK.pdf. 
176. Dr. Jady Hassim, Buku Hitam, working paper.
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surveying and highlight the serious problems confronting professional 
footballers, including: 
• Approximately one in ten players having their contracts 
unjustly terminated, including for reasons such as 
injury.177 
• Players not being paid in accordance with their contracts. 
Specifically, in eastern Europe, over 40%, whilst in 
Asia one in four players were not paid on time.178 
• Players being forced by their employers to work in 
isolation, or train alone, on threat of having to agree to 
employment related demands of the employer such as a 
transfer or early contract termination.179 
• Over 10% of players being subjected to capricious 
sanctions and financial penalties by their employers.180 
• Around 10% of players being subjected to violence by 
fans and club management.181 
• Around 10% of players being subjected to bullying and 
harassment.182 
• Widespread racism. Specifically, over 10% of players 
complained of being subjected to a racist act in eastern 
Europe.183 
• Almost 12% of players in eastern Europe and 7% in Asia 
and Oceania being approached to fix the result of a 
match, often in circumstances of duress.184 
As Professor Ruggie noted in his report to FIFA, “[w]hile the 
immediate cause (of such abuse) is typically clubs, players seeking 
transfers out of such abusive situations appear to have limited options 
 
 177.  See generally FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe the Problems Professional 
Footballers Encounter: Research, supra, note 175; see also Buku Hitam, supra, note 176. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Buku Hitam, supra, note 176. 
 181.   See generally FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe the Problems Professional 
Footballers Encounter: Research, supra, note 175; see also Buku Hitam, supra note 176. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
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in practice.”185 Accordingly, the problems players confront with the 
transfer system are interconnected with the lack of protection of their 
wages and their incapacity to access an effective remedy.  
With effect from 1 May 2015, FIFA imposed a regulatory ban on 
third parties such as agents from owning the “economic rights” arising 
from the transfer of employment of players due to the widespread 
nature of the practice, indicating the existence of a significant market 
for such activities.186 Indeed, Professor Ruggie also wrote: 
…if large numbers of reports are to be believed, human 
trafficking in football continues at significant rates. The 
sources of trafficked players are most likely to be in 
West Africa and parts of Latin America. Their typical 
destination is lower-tier European and Asian clubs, 
although many trafficked players end up in the streets 
rather than on pitches. The vast majority of trafficked 
players are said to be minors. FIFA has been proactive 
in establishing rules to combat trafficking through the 
legal transfer system. But neither the rules nor the 
available resources extend to cover rogue recruiters and 
agents, unsanctioned football academies, and the 
known trafficking routes by which players are sent to 
clubs on other continents operating within FIFA’s 
ambit. This means that there are likely to be players in 
the FIFA governed world of football who have been 
trafficked—and that they include minors.187 
These facts, concerning as they are, certainly do not completely 
set out the human rights risks confronting players in football and 
beyond. For example, some ISOs impose rules that prevent Muslim 
women from playing sport wearing a hijab.188 Additionally, 2016 saw 
the widespread failure on the part of WADA to secure the confidential 
data of athletes uploaded to its anti-doping data base, including 
confidential medical records,189 rising concerns in many sports about 
 
 185.  For the Game. For the World, supra, note 28, at 25. 
 186.  Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, FIFA at 21, 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/70/95/52/regulationso
nthestatusandtransferofplayersnov2016weben_neutral.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
 187.  For the Game. For the World, supra note 28, at 25. 
 188.  See Shireen Ahmed, Will Basketball Do the Right Thing and Lift its Ban on the 
Hijab?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jan/26/basketball-governing-body-fiba-hijab. 
 189.  See Cyber Hack Update: Data leak concerning 41 athletes from 13 countries and 17 
sports, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.wada-
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the long term health impacts of concussion,190 and the revelation of 
widespread abuse of child athletes by English football clubs, now 
being thoroughly reviewed with the assistance of UNICEF.191 These 
developments all point to a systemic failure on the part of sport to 
embed the rights of the players within their governance framework. 
IV. EMBEDDING PLAYER RIGHTS
A. INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED HUMAN RIGHTS
AND LEX SPORTIVA
The challenge and opportunity for all ISOs, including the IOC and 
FIFA, is to uphold their constitutional commitments to human rights 
and legitimize lex sportiva by embedding the fundamental human 
rights of the people at the centre of sport – the players. The UNGPs 
provide the framework for sport to do so in a manner which is now 
consistent with the policy decisions made by the IOC and FIFA in 2016 
and 2017. Whilst considerable substantive and procedural reform and 
negotiation would be required, the realistic outcome is a global sports 
law that complies with internationally recognised human rights and is 
enforceable through a properly designed and agreed grievance 
mechanism, thereby ensuring access to an effective remedy for those 
who have not had their human rights respected and upheld. 
The development of lex sportiva in this way would present the 
third great development in the law as it applies to players. The first, 
running from Eastham through to Bosman and reviewed in Part II(B) 
of this paper, recognised the rights of players under the law of the land 
including as employees. The second, as explained in Part II(C), has 
ama.org/en/media/news/2016-09/cyber-hack-update-data-leak-concerning-41-athletes-from-
13-countries-and-17; Cyber Hack Update: Data leak concerning 20 athletes from 14 countries
and 13 sports, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/media/news/2016-10/cyber-hack-update-data-leak-concerning-20-athletes-from-
14-countries-and-13.
190. See FIFA helps concussion issue move forward, FIFA (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://www.fifa.com/development/news/y=2016/m=11/news=fifa-helps-concussion-issue-
move-forward-2847636.html; Sy Mukherjee, The NFL’s Concussion Problem Isn’t Getting 
Much Better, FORTUNE (Jan. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/29/nfl-concussions-2016/; 
Henry Young, Australian Rugby Union tackles concussion problem with blue card, CNN 
(Mar. 24, 2017, 1:38 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/23/sport/blue-card-aru-rugby-
concussion-warren-mcdonald-australia/.
191. See Katrin Benhold, Child Sexual Abuse Scandal Rocks U.K. Soccer, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/europe/soccer-uk-sexual-
abuse-andy-woodward.html?_r=0; Sarfraz Manzoor, Britain’s Soccer Sex Abuse Scandal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/opinion/britains-soccer-
sex-abuse-scandal.html?_r=0.
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been the development of lex sportiva after the Bosman decision by 
ISOs coupling the notions of specificity and autonomy of sport with 
compulsory arbitration. This is defeating the capacity of players to 
enjoy their rights under national law, and subjecting players to a 
specific legal framework rooted in the interests of the ISOs and the 
employers and which is operating without the State. 
By being based on the dominant position that ISOs have in their 
dealings with players, lex sportiva lacks legitimacy. The lack of 
legitimacy is rooted in four main features: (1) the acknowledged 
failures and conflicts of interest within the governance of ISOs;192 (2) 
the lack of involvement of the people bound by the law in the making 
of it – the players;193 (3) the ongoing violation of the rights of players 
especially vulnerable players who are, naturally, the ones most in need 
of the protection of the law;194 and (4) the law’s lack of recognition and 
compliance with internationally recognised human rights.195 While 
outside the scope of this paper, there are also grounds to suggest a fifth 
– lex sportiva’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the sporting objectives
that theoretically underpin it.196
B. THE APPLICATION OF THE UNGPs to ISOs
The UNGPs are “grounded in recognition” of:
(a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and
192. See supra notes 61 to 70.
193. See generally Lisa A. Kihl & Lucie Thibault, Athletes, Athletes’ Commissions, and
the Governance of International Sport Organisations, U. OF MINN., BROCK U. (Sept. 21, 2012), 
https://www.easm.net/download/2012/d2d32ec712763d5589028c28cb94b2d0.pdf.
194. See generally David Paulo, HUMAN RIGHTS IN YOUTH SPORT (2005); See also
Additionally vulnerable, SPORT AND DEV, https://www.sportanddev.org/en/learn-more/child-
protection-and-safeguarding/additionally-vulnerable-0 (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
 195.  See generally Sport and Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, 
http://www.sportandhumanrights.org/wordpress/ (last visited May 11, 2017); Sarah Joseph, 
Sport and the Law: Sport and Human Rights: Closer than you think, 35 ALTERNATIVE L. J. 
235 (2010). 
196. See WADA ineffective on doping too – Moynihan, BBC SPORT (July 25, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/sport/athletics/36888420; WADA testing “ineffective”, says Australian 
Olympic chief, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2013, 11:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
doping-australia-idUSBRE92005R20130301; Katrin Bennhold, Child Sexual Abuse Scandal 
Rocks U.K. Soccer, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/europe/soccer-uk-sexual-abuse-andy-
woodward.html?_r=0; Sarfraz Manzoor, Britain’s Soccer Sex Abuse Scandal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/opinion/britains-soccer-sex-abuse-
scandal.html; Brendan Schwab, Why Australian sport must cut ties with WADA, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (June 15, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/sport/why-australian-sports-
must-cut-ties-with-wada-20140615-zs8k1.html
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fulfil human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
(b)  The role of business enterprises as specialized
organs of society performing specialized functions,
required to comply with all applicable laws and to
respect human rights;
(c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to
appropriate and effective remedies when breached.197
The UNGPs apply “…to all States and to all business enterprises, 
both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector, location, 
ownership and structure.”198 Accordingly, it can be safely said that the 
UNGPs apply to ISOs and all sporting organisations within the world 
of professional sport, including leagues, clubs, national associations, 
academies, dispute resolution services, regulatory and enforcement 
agencies, and other enterprises such as player agencies. It can also be 
safely said that the UNGPs include the human rights of the players 
within their purview. 
In his report to FIFA, Professor Ruggie wrote: 
FIFA acts vigorously to develop and enforce 
regulations related to its institutional and commercial 
interests. But when it comes to many other matters, 
even where the rules are robust, FIFA’s capacity to 
ensure their implementation is often lacking, and FIFA 
relies heavily on self-regulation by the parties to which 
the rules are addressed.199 
This point is equally applicable to all ISOs and particularly 
relevant in the context of lex sportiva, its construction without the State 
and the capacity of ISOs to ensure its enforcement without regard to 
national law. Having promulgated such a special law in respect of 
players, the ISOs have an increased responsibility to ensure its 
compliance with internationally recognised human rights in 
accordance with the UNGPs.200 The “Foundational Principles” of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights include: “Business 
enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should 
avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address any 
197. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9 at 1. 
198. Id.
199. For the Game. For the World, supra note 28 at 27. See generally FIFA’s Human
Rights Policy May 2017 Edition, supra, note 51.
200. Id.
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adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”201 
By respecting human rights, ISOs would be meeting a “global 
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they 
operate.”202 The standard exists “independently of States’ abilities and 
/ or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations” and “over 
and above national laws and regulations protecting human rights.”203 
Moreover, “enterprises should not undermine States’ abilities to meet 
their own human rights obligations, including by actions that might 
weaken the integrity of judicial processes.”204 The impact of lex 
sportiva¸ coupled with the power of ISOs, can defeat local judicial 
processes by denying players access to judicial remedies or subjecting 
them to an arbitral process which gives paramountcy to the regulations 
of ISOs over national law. 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE UNGPs
The implementation of the UNGPs “protect, respect and remedy”
framework would enable ISOs to proactively address the human rights 
concerns of players in their decision-making processes.205 The starting 
point for ISOs to effectively implement the UNGPs is to make three 
key commitments: 
(1) The constitutional commitments made by ISOs such
as the IOC and FIFA should be replicated by other
ISOs, and translated into daily actions and decisions.
This includes the effort to implement the UNGPs being
reflected in and supported by the decision-making of
the leadership of the ISO and its governing bodies.
Clear expectations should be set and resources
allocated throughout the administration and operations
of the ISO.
(2) A proactive approach must be taken, including the
assessment of human rights risks across the activities
and relationships of the ISO and building and using
leverage.
(3) Human rights risks should be managed
transparently including by ensuring access to an
201. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9 at 13.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at i.v.
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effective remedy for human rights harm. This involves 
routinely discussing human rights risks with external 
stakeholders.206 
(1) A Clear Policy Commitment to Player Rights 
Business enterprises “need to know and show they respect human 
rights.”207 The Foundational Principles of the UNGPs require business 
enterprises to have in place “policies and processes appropriate to their 
size and circumstances,” including, under Principle 15(a), a “policy 
commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights…”208 
Further, the responsibility to respect human rights requires that 
business enterprises “[s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or 
services by their business relationships, even if they have not 
contributed to those impacts.”209 As discussed at Part I(A), the 
responsibility to respect human rights refers to all “internationally 
recognized human rights.”210 
With the exception of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May 2017 
Edition,211 such a policy commitment is presently absent from the 
world of sport. There is also the absence of a clear policy that is 
incorporated within the regulatory regime of ISOs that 
comprehensively documents the fundamental human rights of players 
that are internationally recognised. The Appendix to this paper sets out 
the Universal Declaration of Player Rights (“UDPR”), as adopted by 
the Executive Committee of World Players.212 A commitment to the 
UDPR by ISOs would provide “the basis for embedding [the ISOs] 
responsibility to respect [the] human rights [of the players].”213 This 
requires the policy to be approved at “the most senior level of the 
business enterprise.”214 The UDPR articulates how internationally 
recognised human rights apply to the work and circumstances of the 
players.215 
Article 6(1) of the UDPR provides that every player “has the right 
 
 206.  For the Game. For the World., supra note 28, at 28 to 35.  
 207.  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 16. 
 208.  Id. at 15–16. 
 209.  Id. at 14.  
 210.  Id. at 13-14. 
 211.  FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, supra note 51. 
 212.  Infra Appendix. 
 213.  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 16. 
 214.  Id.  
 215.  Infra Appendix. 
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to organise and collectively bargain,” a right recognised under the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-Up216 and referred to in Principle 12 of the UNGPs.217 However, 
ISOs are far from embedding a policy commitment to this fundamental 
right, even though it should, through appropriate policy, “be embedded 
from the top of the business enterprise through all its functions, which 
otherwise act without awareness or regard for human rights.”218 Indeed, 
ISOs commonly remain concerned by any effort on the part of players 
to organise. 
The response by WADA to the initial moves to establish World 
Players in 2011 is an example of the concerns ISOs express with the 
organisation of athletes into trade unions. Former WADA Chairman 
John Fahey’s minuted remarks to the WADA Foundation Board on 20 
November 2011 read: 
[The player] associations… were based along the lines 
of a union and took their authority from membership, 
which involved receiving paid fees to have people look 
at what were described as the conditions under which 
they operated. Those conditions were of course relevant 
to the pay received to play sport. He thought that it was 
incumbent on all who believed that sport was a very 
different and separate operation to other workplaces to 
make that clear. In his opinion, the least amount of 
credibility given to these people (the athlete unions), 
the better. They must be seen for what they were: a 
union, and if individual sportsmen and women wanted 
that, it was their choice. But WADA should make this 
clear at every opportunity possible and under no 
circumstance would it recognise them as 
representatives of the sportsmen and women of the 
world.219 
However, some 80,000 players, represented through legitimate 
trade unions and player associations, are bound by the WADA Code, 
which forms a fundamental term of their employment or involvement 
 
 216.  ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, 
supra, note 34. 
 217.  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 13. 
 218.  Id. at 17.  
 219.  Minutes of the WADA Foundation Board Meeting, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, at 
48 (Nov. 20, 2011), https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_foundation_board_meeting_minutes_20nov2
011_eng_final.pdf (emphasis added). 
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in sport.220 These players and their organisations constitute World 
Players, as shown in Table 1: 
Table 1221 
Affiliate	 Country	 Player 
associations	
Players	 WADA 
jurisdiction	
AAA	 AUS	 5	 2,529	 Yes	
EU Athletes	 NED	 27	 7,467	 Yes	
FICA	 ENG	 7	 1,618	 Yes	
FIFPro	 NED	 60	 65,000	 Yes	
IRPA	 NZL	 10	 3,000	 Yes	
JPBPA	 JPN	 1	 735	 No	
NBPA	 USA	 1	 400	 No	
NFLPA	 USA	 1	 1,800	 No	
NHLPA	 CAN	 1	 750	 No	
TOTAL 	 113	 83,299	 79,622	
 
Concerns over athlete unionisation extend across the Olympic 
Movement. Mr. John Coates, the Vice President of the IOC, the 
President of the AOC and the President of both the CAS and the 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (“ICAS”), the body 
responsible for financing and administering the CAS, told Australian 
radio in late 2015 that: “[t]hese are the unions who are not elected 
representatives of the athletes. I know who they are.”222 When asked 
whether he thought players or athletes should not have union bodies 
representing them, he said: 
I think our position is that all bodies should have 
athletes representatives on their board who are elected 
by the athletes themselves. That is the case with the 
Athletes Commissions in the national federations and 
the Australian Olympic Committee. It is not some other 
self-appointed body that goes out and negotiates wages 
and other matters for them.223 
 
 220.  See generally Code Signatories, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/code-signatories (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
 221.  Athletes’ Rights and Mega- Sporting Events, supra, note 128 at 21. 
 222.  Tracey Holmes, Olympic boss John Coates ‘embarrassed’ by Rowing Australia ‘right 
to silence’ provision oversight, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2015, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-04/john-coates-embarrassed-by-rowing-australia-
oversight/7000102. 
 223.  Id. 
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At the 2017 Sport Accord Convention, Sport Accord’s President 
Mr. Patrick Baumann, criticized the apparent political role of Athlete 
Commissions despite their regulated power.224 Mr. Baumann, who 
holds various positions in sport including IOC member, Secretary 
General of the Fédération Internationale de Basketball (“FIBA”), 
Council Member of the Association of Summer Olympic International 
Federations (“ASOIF”), Board Member of ICAS and IOC 
representative on the Foundation Board of WADA,225 stated to the 
convention: 
Athletes’ Commission(s) are starting to become 
political. They have opinions on everything and this can 
be a particular problem…The expansion of the role, I 
think, should be somehow a little bit controlled. We are 
absolutely there to help, to work, and create the best 
environment for them to compete. But if it becomes 
unionised, we are creating more harm than benefits.226 
The right to organise and collectively bargain, as enshrined in 
article 20 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 is, of course, a fundamental international 
labour standard.227 Recognition and respect for the right to organise and 
collectively bargain involves an obligation on the part of employers 
and their representatives not to interfere with the independent pursuit 
and exercise of that right.228 Article 2 of the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) of the ILO provides: 
1. Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall enjoy 
adequate protection against any acts of interference by 
each other or each other’s agents or members in their 
establishment, functioning or administration. 
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the 
 
 224.  See supra notes 131 to 140. 
 225.  Mr. Patrick Baumann, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, 
https://www.olympic.org/mr-patrick-baumann   
 226.  See Nick Butler, Baumann criticizes political role of sporting Athletes’ Commissions, 
INSIDE THE GAMES, (Apr. 4, 2017), 
http://www.insidethegames.biz/index.php/articles/1048883/sportaccord-convention-day-two 
(emphasis added).  
 227.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 8; ILO Convention 87, 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, INT’L LAB. 
ORGANIZATION (1948), http://blue.lim.ilo.org/cariblex/pdfs/ILO_Convention_87.pdf; ILO 
Convention 98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, INT’L LAB. ORG. 
(1949), http://blue.lim.ilo.org/cariblex/pdfs/ILO_Convention_98.pdf.  
 228.  ILO Convention 98, Art. 2 (1949). 
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establishment of workers’ organisations under the 
domination of employers or employers’ organisations, 
or to support workers’ organisations by financial or 
other means, with the object of placing such 
organisations under the control of employers or 
employers’ organisations, shall be deemed to constitute 
acts of interference within the meaning of this Article.229 
In May 2017, FIFA, in reporting on its human rights record in 
accordance with Professor Ruggie’s recommendations of April 2016, 
noted that “[s]ome of the main achievements” included “the 
broadening of engagement with football stakeholders, including with 
the international union of professional football players FIFPro, 
towards enhancing the protection of players’ rights,”230 the 
“establishment of a pilot project for the implementation and 
development of national dispute resolution chambers, and a 
significantly increased engagement with relevant stakeholders, in 
particular with organisations representing the interests of professional 
footballers.”231 
(2) A Player Rights Due Diligence Process
The Foundational Principles of the UNGPs require business
enterprises, in order to meet their responsibility to respect human 
rights, to carry out “[a] human rights due diligence process to identify, 
prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on 
human rights…”232 
Principle 17 sets out the principles of an effective human rights 
due diligence: 
In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
how they address their adverse human rights impacts, 
business enterprises should carry out human rights due 
diligence. The process should include assessing actual 
and potential human rights impacts, integrating and 
acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and 
communicating how impacts are addressed. Human 
rights due diligence…should be ongoing.233 
229. Id.
230. FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights May 2017, supra, note 53 at 2.
231. Id., 16.
232. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 16.
233. Id. at 17-18.
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Principles 20 and 21 require business enterprises to “track the 
effectiveness of their response” and “be prepared to communicate this 
externally, particularly when concerns are raised by or on behalf of 
affected stakeholders.”234 
Human rights due diligence is presently absent from key 
decisions made by ISOs that affect players. For example, a human 
rights due diligence is not undertaken in relation to the making of the 
myriad of regulations that affect players. However, according to the 
UNGPs, “(h)uman rights due diligence should be initiated as early as 
possible in the development of a new activity or relationship, given 
that human rights risks can be increased or mitigated already at the 
stage of structuring contracts or other agreements.”235 Further, “in order 
to gauge human rights risks,” the process of human rights due diligence 
should draw on “internal and / or independent external human rights 
expertise” and “involve meaningful consultation with potentially 
affected groups and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the 
size of the business enterprise and the nature and context of the 
operation.”236 
The undertaking of human rights due diligence involves a 
fundamental reversal in the assessment of the player rights impacts of 
the decisions of ISOs. As Part II(B) of this paper illustrated, certain 
players over time have been willing to sacrifice their short term and 
precarious careers to advance the collective interests of the players 
through expensive and time consuming litigation.237 The onus – in 
terms of the practical burden even if not legally – has been great. 
Human rights due diligence reverses this. By proactively undertaking 
the process in the policy making and legislative phase, ISOs can 
properly engage with players and their chosen representatives together 
with other relevant experts to ensure that any potential adverse human 
rights impacts are prevented, minimised, mitigated and accounted for. 
WADA’s approach in 2013 and 2014 to addressing the human 
rights impacts on players of the proposed revision of the WADA Code 
to take effect in 2015 did not involve this fundamental reversal. 
WADA engaged Jean-Paul Costa to write a legal opinion to confirm 
the compatibility of several provisions of the draft revision of the 
WADA Code with the accepted principles of international law and 
234. Id. at 22-23.
235. Id. at 18.
236. Id. at 19.
237. See supra notes 77 to 108.
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human rights.238 Mr. Costa, who served as a judge in the European 
Court of Human Rights for thirteen years,239 did not refer to the UNGPs 
in his opinion nor the responsibilities of States to protect human rights 
and business to respect them.240 The opinion did not include any human 
rights risk assessment or due diligence, nor did it refer to the 
importance of “meaningful consultation with potentially affected 
groups” in accordance with the UNGPs.241 The opinion did note, 
however, that the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which 
monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, has a “universal mandate but is a quasi-
jurisdiction without the authority to enforce its decisions.”242 
The Official Basketball Rules 2014 as promulgated by FIBA 
provide a straightforward example of the benefits that would flow from 
ISOs proactively incorporating human rights due diligence into their 
decision-making processes.243 Rule 4.4.2 has long provided that 
“[p]layers shall not wear equipment (objects) that may cause injury to 
other players. The following are not permitted . . . Headgear, hair 
accessories and jewellery.”244  
This rule, ostensibly created to promote player safety, has the 
impact of discriminating against, for example, Muslim women whose 
faith requires them to play in a headscarf.245 The impact of the rule has 
been to deny a player such as Bilqis Abdul-Qaadir the right to play 
basketball and pursue it as a profession.246 Through the application of 
the UNGPs, FIBA is obliged to remove that impact and ensure that the 
Rule’s stated purpose of player safety is advanced in a way that 
furthers the growth and development of the sport and is consistent with 
238. WADA, Legal opinion on the 2015 Code (June 2013), https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/WADC-Legal-Opinion-on-Draft-2015-Code-3.0-
EN.pdf. 
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 9 to 10, Part I.
241. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 19.
242. Legal opinion on the 2015 Code, supra note 238; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra, note 32. 
243. See generally Official Basketball Rules 2014, FIBA CENT. BOARD (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.fiba.com/downloads/rules/2014/official_basketball_rules_2014_y.pdf. 
244. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
245. See Stephanie Kline, FIBA’s ‘hijab ban’ still the rule in women’s basketball, LIMA
CHARLIE NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.limacharlienews.com/op-ed/fiba-hijab-ban-
womens-basketball/. 
246. See Danny Davis, For Muslim woman, ban on hijab ended basketball career, MY 
STATESMAN (Mar. 11, 2017, 6:37 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/sports/for-muslim-
woman-ban-hijab-ended-basketball-career/5s4qW6xE5z03ielj7EKYYI/. 
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the human rights of players. 
In 2014, football addressed an identical situation following a two-
year trial period.247 FIFPro worked in conjunction with FIFA and 
representatives of the game and players in Western Asia to amend the 
Laws of the Game so that players could play in a headscarf.248 Apparel 
and equipment manufacturers were extensively involved in that 
process to ensure that all player health and safety concerns were 
addressed.249 The wearing of headscarves by Muslim players is now 
common place and in 2016, Jordan hosted the FIFA Under 17 
Women’s World Cup.250 
The human rights due diligence process mandated by the UNGPs 
would have identified the discriminatory impact of FIBA’s Rule 4.2.2 
in relation to Muslim women, allowing FIBA to mitigate the impact of 
the Rule by permitting headgear that is safe. For instance, the Laws of 
the Game of football now provide that “[n]on-dangerous protective 
equipment, for example headgear, facemasks and knee and arm 
protectors made of soft, lightweight padded material is permitted…”251 
(3) Access to an Effective Remedy
The third key commitment of ISOs in order to meet their
responsibility to respect human rights is to have in place “[p]rocesses 
to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they 
247. See FIFA lifts ban on head covers, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 1, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/sport/football/2014/03/fifa-allows-hijab-turban-players-
20143113053667394.html. 
248. See Laws of the Game 2016/2017, THE INT’L FOOTBALL ASS’N BOARD, at 42 (June 1,
2016), 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/footballdevelopment/refereeing/02/79/92/44/laws.of.the.
game.2016.2017_neutral.pdf; see also Jordanian legacy bodes well for future of women’s 
football, FIFA.COM (Oct. 24, 2016), 
http://www.fifa.com/u17womensworldcup/news/y=2016/m=10/news=jordanian-legacy-
bodes-well-for-future-of-women-s-football-2845723.html; see also Fifa allows wearing of 
head covers for religious reasons, BBC SPORT (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/26398297.  
249. See Scott Rafferty, Nike Developing ‘Pro Hijab’ for Muslim Athletes, ROLLING 
STONE (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/nikes-pro-hijab-being-developed-
for-muslim-athletes-w470970. 
250. See Shireen Ahmed, Inclusion, excitement and a series of firsts in Jordan at U17
Women’s World Cup, EXCELLE SPORTS (Sept. 30, 2016), 
http://www.excellesports.com/news/inclusion-excitement-series-firsts-jordan-u17-womens-
world-cup/; see also Jordanian legacy bodes well for future of women’s football, FIFA.COM 
(Oct. 24, 2016), 
http://www.fifa.com/u17womensworldcup/news/y=2016/m=10/news=jordanian-legacy-
bodes-well-for-future-of-women-s-football-2845723.html. 
251. See Laws of the Game 2016/2017, supra note 248, at 42.
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cause or to which they contribute.”252 Where ISOs “have caused or 
contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in 
their remediation through legitimate processes.”253 This third 
commitment acknowledges that, even “with the best policies and 
practices, a business enterprise may cause or contribute to adverse 
human rights impacts that it has not foreseen or been able to 
prevent.”254 
As this paper has considered at Part II(C), ISOs including the 
IOC, FIFA and WADA operate a sophisticated arbitration system 
through the ICAS and the CAS. However, as Professor Ruggie noted 
in his report to FIFA, “[i]f an arbitration system is going to deal 
effectively with human rights-related complaints, it needs certain 
procedural and substantive protections to be able to deliver on that 
promise” and for such an arbitration system to deal effectively with 
human rights-related complaints.255 Specifically, Recommendation 6.2 
of Professor Ruggie’s report reads: 
FIFA should review its existing dispute resolution 
system for football-related issues to ensure that it does 
not lead in practice to a lack of access to effective 
remedy for human rights harms. 
FIFA should ensure that its own dispute resolution 
bodies have adequate human rights expertise and 
procedures to address human rights claims, and urge 
member associations, Confederations and the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport to do the same; 
The review should involve independent experts as well 
as representatives of players and other users of the 
system.256 
Principle 31 of the UNGPs sets out some criteria to measure the 
effectiveness of non-judicial grievance mechanisms.257 A mechanism 
“can only serve its purpose if the people it is intended to serve know 
about it, trust it and are able to use it…(W)here outcomes have 
implications for human rights, care should be taken to ensure they are 
252. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 15–16.
253. Id. at 24.
254. Id.
255. For the Game. For the World, supra note 28, at 26.
256. Id. at 35.
257. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 33-35.
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in line with internationally recognized human rights.”258 Accordingly, 
grievance mechanisms should be: legitimate; accessible; predictable; 
equitable; transparent; rights-compatible; a source of continuous 
learning; and based on engagement and dialogue.259 
The international standard for the conduct and international 
recognition of arbitral awards is the 1958 United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.260 
Among many procedural safeguards, it requires the composition of the 
arbitral panel to be “in accordance with the agreement of the parties.”261 
This is a challenge to sport’s global governance framework which 
gives sporting interests, including those of the IOC and ISOs, 
substantial perceived control and influence over sports arbitration, 
including the CAS. The ICAS is presently dominated by 
representatives of ISOs, with the only athlete representatives being 
appointed by the IOC Athletes Commission.262 The structure of the 
ICAS highlights the burning questions over the legitimacy of lex 
sportiva.263 Similarly, the UNGPs make it clear that: “Since a business 
enterprise cannot, with legitimacy, both be the subjects of complaints 
and unilaterally determine their outcome, these mechanisms should 
focus on reaching agreed solutions through dialogue. Where 
adjudication is needed, this should be provided by a legitimate, 
independent third-party mechanism.”264 
The UNGPs therefore recommend “collaborative initiatives” to 
ensure: 
…the availability of effective mechanisms through 
which affected parties or their legitimate 
representatives can raise concerns when they believe 
the (human rights) commitments in question have not 
been met. The legitimacy of such measures may be put 
at risk if they do not provide for such 
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
U.N. (2015), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-
Convention-E.pdf. 
261. Id. at 10.
262. See generally Members, CT. OF ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/icas/members.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2017); Code of Sports-related Arbitration, 
CT. OF ARB. FOR SPORT (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.tas-
cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Code_2017_FINAL__en_.pdf. 
263. See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, Id..
264. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 35.
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mechanisms…These mechanisms should provide for 
accountability and help enable the remediation of 
adverse human rights impacts.265 
In May 2017, FIBA announced that Rule 4.2.2 of the Official 
Basketball Rules 2014 was to be amended with effect from 1 October 
2017 to allow the wearing of hijabs. FIBA’s announcement read: 
FIBA initiated a revision process of its headgear rule 
in September 2014, with exceptions being granted at 
national level as part of a two-year testing period. 
This past January, the (FIBA) Central Board received 
a report and, upon reviewing it, approved for the rule 
to be modified. It issued a mandate to its Technical 
Commission to come up with a proposal and this was 
approved by the Central Board on Wednesday (3 May 
2017).266
The presence within FIBA of an effective grievance mechanism 
would have ensured that Muslim basketball player Bilqis Abdul-
Qaadir could have pursued her rights to access and play basketball 
without losing three years of her career due to having been 
discriminated because of her gender and religion. Her inability to do 
so demonstrates the importance of FIBA ensuring that affected 
players can access an effective remedy in a timely manner. 
VI.  CONCLUSION
The continued revelations of wide-spread and systemic
corruption, cheating, and human rights abuse in world sport have 
rightly created a crisis of confidence in the governance of ISOs. This 
paper highlights how ISOs are also failing to protect, respect, and fulfil 
the fundamental human rights of the players whose careers and 
livelihoods depend on sport’s legal framework and system of justice. 
The precarious position of the player at law and at work has been 
exacerbated by the development of a special sports law – lex sportiva 
– which lacks legitimacy. Imposed through dominant, albeit
questionable governance structures, the law’s lack of legitimacy is
rooted in four main features: (1) the acknowledged failures and
conflicts of interest within the governance of ISOs;267 (2) the lack of
265. Id. at 33.
266. FIBA, FIBA’s Mid-Term Congress unanimously ratifies new headgear rule, (May 4,
2017), http://www.fiba.com/news/fibas-mid-term-congress-ratifies-new-headgear-rule 
267. See supra IV(A).
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involvement of the people bound by the law in the making of it – the 
players;268 (3) the ongoing violation of the rights of players (especially 
vulnerable players who are, naturally, the ones most in need of the 
protection of the law);269 and (4) the law’s lack of recognition and 
compliance with internationally recognised human rights.270 While 
outside the scope of this paper, there are also grounds to suggest a fifth 
– lex sportiva’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the sporting objectives
that theoretically underpin it. 271
The challenge and opportunity for all ISOs, including the IOC and 
FIFA, is to uphold their constitutional commitments to human rights 
and legitimize lex sportiva by embedding the fundamental human 
rights of the players. The UNGPs provide the framework for sport to 
do so in a manner which is now consistent with key policy decisions 
made in 2016 and 2017. Whilst considerable substantive and 
procedural reform and negotiation would be required, the realistic 
outcome is a global sports law that complies with internationally 
recognised human rights and which is enforceable through a properly 
designed and agreed grievance mechanism, thereby ensuring access to 
an effective remedy for those who have not had their human rights 
respected and upheld.  
The lack of legitimacy of lex sportiva and its adverse human 
rights impacts on players are both known to the ISOs. It is time for 
them to use that knowledge to do better. 
The development of lex sportiva in this way would present the 
third great development in the law as it applies to players since the 
early 1960s. It would not only legitimize lex sportiva, it would play a 
vital role in restoring confidence in the governance of ISOs. Sport 
would be a force for good by setting a global benchmark for the respect 
and fulfilment of human rights by business. 
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See supra note 196.
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APPENDIX –THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF PLAYER
RIGHTS 
PREAMBLE 
CONSIDERING THAT: 
I. The organised players of the world have a proud history of
championing the dignity of the player and the humanity of sport. That 
history demonstrates that where the fundamental human rights of the 
player have been protected, respected and guaranteed, sport has grown 
as both a social institution and as an economic activity and business. 
II. In adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, the peoples of the United Nations “reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom.”i 
III. A universal commitment by the whole of sport is now
essential for sport to maintain its meaningful place in world culture, 
retain its social licence, make social progress and achieve better 
standards of life for everyone involved with or touched by it. 
IV. Sport is controlled by international sporting federations,
national sporting organisations, professional sports leagues, 
employers, business and governments. Players are the public face of 
sport, and athletic performance is fundamental to the prestige, 
popularity and viability of sport. 
V. The mega scale, politicisation and commercialisation of sport
today sees a widespread failure to uphold the humanity of sport and 
the dignity of the player.ii This also sees the violation by sport of 
internationally recognised human rights – which are, at a minimum, 
those expressed in The International Bill of Human Rights, the 
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.iii 
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CONSEQUENTLY: 
VI. Every sport must:
A. work in partnership with the players to develop a strategic
vision for their sport;iv
B. respect, protect and guarantee the fundamental human rights
of everyone involved with or affected by sport including the
player;v
C. avoid infringing on the human rights of others and eliminate
all adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved;vi
D. embrace and promote the responsibility of their sport to
respect human rights;vii
E. recognise that the player is, first, a human person and, then,
an athlete;viii
F. acknowledge the acute impact any failure to respect the
fundamental human rights of the player given the highly
skilled and inherently short-term nature of the athletic career;
G. acknowledge that any reliance on or application of the
“autonomy” or “specificity” of sport or any restraint or
limitation imposed on a player in the exercise of his or her
profession does not override the fundamental human rights of
the player and can only be given legal effect if necessary and
through collective bargaining and social dialogue;ix and
H. ensure that the internationally recognised human rights of the
player including as contained in this Universal Declaration of
Player Rights are legally adopted within the constituent
documents of their sport or pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement.x
NOW, THEREFORE, THE ORGANISED PLAYERS OF THE 
WORLD DECLARE THAT: 
Article 1. Protect, respect, remedy. 
Every player has the right to a sporting environment that is well 
governed, free of corruption, manipulation and cheating and protects, 
respects and guarantees the fundamental human rights of everyone 
involved in or affected by sport, including the player.xi 
4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/17  7:54 PM 
2017]      WHEN WE KNOW BETTER, WE DO BETTER 61 
Article 2. Access to sport. 
Every player has the right to access and pursue sportxii as a career 
and professionxiii based solely on merit.xiv 
Article 3. Equality of opportunity. 
(1) Every player is entitled to equality of opportunity in the
pursuit of sport without distinction of any kind and free of 
discrimination, harassment and violence.xv  
(2)  A player’s right to pursue sport cannot be limited because of
his or her race, colour, birth, age, language, sexual orientation, gender, 
pregnancy, religion, political or other opinion, responsibilities as a 
carer, property or other status.xvi 
Article 4. Rights of the child. 
Every player who is a minor is entitled to the opportunity to freely 
pursue sport in an inclusive, adapted and safe manner, and to have his 
or her rights as a child protected, respected and guaranteed.xvii 
Article 5. Right to work. 
Every player has the right to work and the free choice of 
employment as an athlete,xviii and to move freely in pursuit of that work 
and employment.xix 
Article 6. Right to organise and collectively bargain. 
(1) Every player has the right to organise and collectively
bargain.xx 
(2)  Every player has the right to form and join player and athlete
associations and unions for the protection of his or her interests.xxi 
Article 7. Right to share in economic activity and wealth. 
Every player has the right to share fairly in the economic activity 
and wealth of his or her sport which players have helped generate.xxii 
Article 8. Fair and just working conditions. 
(1)  Every player has the right to just and favourable remuneration
and conditions of work, including a minimum wage, fair hours of 
work, rest, leisure, the protection of wages, the certainty of a secure 
contract and the protection of his or her status as a worker within the 
employment relationship.xxiii 
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(2) Every player, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work.xxiv 
(3) A player has the right to negotiate the terms and conditions
upon which he or she is involved in sport and to be represented by 
persons and organisations of his or her choosing in those 
negotiations.xxv 
(4) A player must only be bound by terms and conditions which
are legitimately made and administered through collective bargaining 
or to which he or she has freely and genuinely consented.xxvi 
Article 9. Promotion of physical health, mental health and 
social wellbeing. 
(1) Every player must be provided with a safe and secure
workplace and sporting environment, which promotes the player’s 
safety, physical and mental health and his or her social wellbeing.xxvii 
(2) A player must be treated and supported with utmost integrity
by healthcare professionals when injured or ill, and have direction and 
control over that treatment and support.xxviii 
(3) A player’s workplace and sporting environment must be
protected from both internal and external risks to his or her safety, 
health and wellbeing. A player is entitled to decide on the measures 
necessary to ensure the safety and security of the workplace and 
sporting environment and to take any action reasonably necessary to 
avoid those risks or prevent them from materialising.xxix 
Article 10. Right to education. 
To achieve fully his or her human potential and personality, every 
player has the right to an education and the pursuit of work and life 
beyond sport supplemented by the resources of the sport.xxx 
Article 11. Right to privacy and the protection of personal data. 
Every player has the right to a private life, privacy and protection 
in relation to the collection, storage and transfer of personal data.xxxi 
Article 12. Protection of name, image and performance. 
Every player is entitled to have his or her name, image and 
performance protected. A player’s name, image and performance may 
only be commercially utilised with his or her consent, voluntarily 
given.xxxii 
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Article 13. Freedom of opinion and expression. 
Every player has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression.xxxiii 
Article 14. Protection of and equality before the law. 
Every player has the right to the protection of the law and equality 
before it.xxxiv 
Article 15. Right to due process. 
Every player is entitled to due process including, where charged, 
to the presumption of innocence. Any penalty must be lawful, 
proportionate and just.xxxv 
Article 16. Right to an effective remedy. 
Every player is entitled to have any dispute resolved through an 
impartial and expeditious grievance mechanism in which the player 
has an equal say in the appointment of the grievance panel, arbitrator 
or other decision-making person or body. His or her sport must ensure 
he or she is provided with access to an effective remedy where his or 
her rights under this Declaration have not been protected or 
respected.xxxvi 
Article 17. Duty to respect the rights of others. 
Every player has a duty to respect the rights of his or her fellow 
players under this Declaration, and to respect the fundamental human 
rights of everyone involved with or affected by sport.xxxvii 
THIS DECLARATION IS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 
MEETING IN PARIS, FRANCE ON THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL 2017. 
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xv UDHR, Article 2. Also see, for example, Article 1.4 of the UNESCO 
Charter in relation to women and girls. 
xvi UDHR, Article 2. ICCPR, Article 26. 
xvii ICCPR, Article 24.1. Also refer to the UNCRC in its entirety, as 
well as the Preamble and Article 9.2 of the UNESCO Charter which 
identifies the problem of the excessive training of children. ICESCR, 
Article 10.3. 
xviii UNESCO Charter, Preamble, Article 9.2 and Article 10.5. UDHR, 
Article 23.1. ICESCR, Article 6.1. ICCPR, Article 8.3(a). ILO FD, 
including ILO C29 and ILO C105. Note C29, Article 2.1 and the 
definition of the term “forced or compulsory labour” which the ILO 
regards as including the threatening of workers with severe 
deprivations such as the withholding of wages and the restriction of 
peoples’ movements (see, for example, p. 23 of the ILO’s policy guide 
on the ILO FD at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declaration/
documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf (accessed 17 June 2017)).  
xix UDHR, Articles 13 and 23.1. ICCPR, Article 12. TFEU, Article 
45.1. 
xx ILO FD, ILO C87 and ILO C98. ICCPR, Article 22. 
xxi UDHR, Article 24.4. ICESCR, Article 8.1 (which also refers to the 
right of trade unions to form and join national and international trade 
union organizations). ILO FD including ILO C87 and ILO C98. 
ICCPR, Article 22. 
xxii ILO FD, Preamble, which states that “in seeking to maintain the 
link between social progress and economic growth, the guarantee of 
fundamental principles and rights at work is of particular significance 
in that it enables the persons concerned to claim freely and on the basis 
of equality of opportunity their fair share of the wealth which they have 
helped to generate, and to achieve fully their human potential…” 
(emphasis added). 
xxiii UDHR, Articles 23.1, 23.3 and 24. ICESCR, Articles 7(a)(i) and 
(d). ILO C95. ILO R198. 
xxiv UDHR, Article 23.2. ICESCR, Article 7(a)(i). 
xxv UDHR, Articles 23.1, 23.3 and 23.4. ICCPR, Article 25(a). 
xxvi ILO FD, including ILO C29, ILO C87, ILO C98 and ILO C105. 
UDHR Articles 23.1 and 23.3. ICESCR, Articles 6.1, 7 and 8. 
xxvii ICESCR, Article 12. ILO C155. UNESCO Charter, Article 10.5. 
xxviii ILO C155. ICESCR, Article 12 including Articles 12.2(b),(c) and 
(d). UNESCO Charter, including the Preamble and Article 10. 
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xxix ILO C155. UNESCO Charter, including Article 10.5. UDHR, 
Article 3. ICCPR, Articles 7 (in particular, the second sentence) and 9. 
xxx UNESCO Charter. UDHR, Articles 22, 26.1 and 26.2. ICESCR, 
Articles 6.2 and 13. 
xxxi UDHR, Articles 3 and 12. ICCPR, Article 17. CFREU, Articles 7 
and 8. 
xxxii UDHR, Articles 12, 17 and 27.2. ICCPR, Article 17. 
xxxiii UDHR, Articles 18, 19 and 20. ICCPR, Articles 19 and 21. 
xxxiv UDHR, Articles 6 and 7. ICCPR, Articles 14, 16 and 26. 
xxxv UDHR, Article 10. ICCPR, Article 14. CFREU, Articles 47 and 
48. 
xxxvi UNGPs. NYC. UDHR, Articles 8 and 11.1. ICCPR, Article 14. 
CFREU, Article 47. 
xxxvii UDHR, Article 29.1. 
